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Les instituts d’études avancées 
français sont des lieux d’échange 
propices à la créativité des cher-
cheurs du monde entier qui y 
sont accueillis, chacun poursui-
vant une politique scientifique 
propre en partie déterminée par 
sa situation locale et sa genèse 
historique. Réunis au sein d’un 
réseau, le RFIEA, les IEA offrent 
à la France une plateforme col-
laborative spécifique dans des 
disciplines les plus diverses et 
lui procurent une visibilité qui 
rendent la France bien plus 
attractive pour les chercheurs du 
monde entier. Reliés à d’autres 
IEA en Europe, ils forment un 
formidable réservoir d’expertise 
et de savoirs qui couvre tous les 
champs des sciences humaines 
et sociales.
Pour autant, les SHS souffrent 
d’un manque de reconnais-
sance, quand elles ne se voient 
pas retirer même jusqu’à leur 
scientificité. Or, par la diversité 
des sujets abordés au cours des 
résidences de chercheurs, les 
IEA démontrent la vitalité et la 
nécessité des SHS : des mathé-
matiques à l’économie, de l’an-
thropologie à l’archéologie, la 
sociologie et la psychologie, sans 
oublier l’histoire et la culture, les 
SHS s’occupent fondamentale-
ment de la diversité humaine. 
Les recherches et l’avancement 
des connaissances dans ces dis-
ciplines sont indispensables 
à nos sociétés d’aujourd’hui : 
leurs résultats doivent guider les 
choix des citoyens comme des 
politiques à un moment où une 
grave crise traverse l’Europe et le 
monde. Les conditions d’accueil 
des IEA permettent justement 
aux chercheurs de poursuivre 
des recherches au long cours, 
sans contrainte administrative 
ou budgétaire, au sein d’une 
communauté scientifique plu-
ridisciplinaire, afin d’accéder à 
une meilleure compréhension 
des problèmes scientifiques 
posées et de faire éclore de nou-
velles idées.
Outre les IEA, il existe en 
Europe un autre espace de 
liberté permettant la création 
de plateformes d’échanges : 
l’Intergovernamental European 
framework for COoperation in 
Science and Technology, autre-
ment appelé COST, dont je suis 
la directrice. Depuis sa création 
en 1971 par 19 pays vision-
naires, COST offre aux cher-
cheurs de toutes disciplines un 
espace de liberté nécessaire au 
dialogue, aux recherches avan-
cées, à la création et à l’utili-
sation d’idées dans dans tous 
les domaines de la science et 
de la technologie. Les sciences 
humaines et sociales y occupent 
une place prépondérante, et les 
projets couvrent des sujets aussi 
divers que la littérature, le mul-
tilinguisme, la mémoire trans-
culturelle, l’éthique en cas de 
catastrophes, l’adaptation des 
systèmes de santé européens 
à la diversité, la recherche sur 
les conflits, l’architecture ou les 
droits de l’homme… La mis-
sion principale de COST est 
de favoriser l’innovation scien-
tifique menant à de nouveaux 
concepts et produits, afin de 
contribuer à renforcer les capa-
cités de recherche et d’innova-
tion européenne.
COST poursuit trois objectifs 
majeurs : (i) utiliser l’immense 
potentiel de l’Europe en reliant 
les communautés scientifiques 
de haut niveau sur le continent 
et de l’ouvrir au monde, (ii) 
offrir des possibilités de mise en 
réseaux pour les chercheurs en 
début de carrière et (iii) accroître 
l’impact de la recherche sur les 
décideurs locaux, nationaux et 
européens, les organismes de 
réglementation ainsi que sur le 
secteur privé à l’échelle du conti-
nent. Son esprit est résolument 
pan-Européen puisque 361 pays 
participent à son activité. COST 
offre ainsi à l’Europe un lieu de 
dialogue et de confiance avec 
une approche très simple, qui est 
de laisser les chercheurs se ren-
contrer, se connaître, se réunir, 
et d’élaborer un langage com-
mun permettant une mutuelle 
compréhension propice à 
l’avancement des idées et des 
connaissances. La dimension 
internationale s’impose tout 
naturellement, et l’attractivité 
de l’Europe et de chacun de ses 
pays s’établit sans difficulté ni 
entrave.
À l’instar de COST, les IEA 
démontrent également que 
l’espace et les principes qu’ils 
proposent intéressent les cher-
cheurs du monde entier, car les 
sujets tels qu’ils y sont traités, 
les cultures des lieux où ils sont 
situés, les environnements scien-
tifiques stimulants qu’ils offrent 
sont une opportunité unique 
pour chaque chercheur de se 
poser pendant un temps défini 
et de travailler sereinement à la 
rencontre d’autres esprits. De 
manière marginale mais non 
moins nécessaire, on y apprend 
la générosité, la tolérance et 
l’entente mutuelle, valeurs éga-
lement essentielles à l’évolution 
de notre monde…
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PROBLEMS AND 
THEORIES
The head of a prestigious scien-
tific institution recently said, by 
paraphrasing a famous quota-
tion: “we solve problems that are 
posed, not that we pose”. This 
view totally misses the history 
and role of human knowledge 
construction and prepares 
wrong ways for evaluating it.
Science is not problem solving, it 
is theory building. Any relevant, 
difficult problem requires the 
construction of a new theoreti-
cal frame to deal with the pro-
blem in an original and effective 
way. Moreover, problems follow 
from the proposal of a theory.
Animals continually solve pro-
blems that are posed to them 
by events. We, the humans, by 
language, in our communica-
ting community, we looked at 
the Moon, at the Stars, which 
pose no problem, and invented 
Myths and Theories, and derived 
from them countless problems. 
We also looked at inert matter, 
a stone, some sand on a Greek 
beach, and proposed the atomis-
tic theory. Science originated by 
these attempts to organize the 
world by concepts and theories. 
Later, it was radically renewed 
by looking again at planets, but 
from a different perspective: 
from the point of view of the 
Sun, on the grounds of a dif-
ferent metaphysics, which lead 
to a theoretical revolution. It 
was also renewed by looking at 
two falling stones in an original 
way and at physical trajectories 
as inertial, at the infinite limit 
of a non-existing frictionless 
movement.
As a matter of fact, science is 
not the progressive occupa-
tion of reality by known tools, 
it is instead the definition of 
the very objects of knowledge, 
the construction of new pers-
pectives and of new concep-
tual frames. Problems follow 
from these active constructions 
of knowledge, interact with it. 
Relevant problems, posed wit-
hin a given theory, require a new 
insight, a change of perspective, 
often a new theory. And in the 
history of science, theories can 
be hardly distinguished from 
philosophical thinking. This 
may be implicit, but further 
novelties and critical reflections 
are enhanced by explicit philo-
sophical frames, sometimes also 
in interaction with the arts and 
their proper knowledge content 
and expression (Weyl, 1952; 
Angelini, Lupacchini, 2013; 
Longo, 2011). This interplay 
is at the core of the history of 
mathematics, physics, biology; 
it reached a very high intensity 
in some of the most produc-
tive moments of our cultural 
and scientific invention, the 
vi-iv centuries BC in Greece, 
the Renaissance and during the 
decades of formation of xxth-
century mathematics, physics 
and biology, bridging the last 
two centuries.
In contrast to this, one pro-
minent physicist stated once 
that “the philosophy of science 
is about as useful to scientists 
as ornithology is to birds”. And 
birds are very good at solving 
their problems. Yet, can one 
set apart the scientific work 
by Darwin, Riemann, Poin-
caré, Bohr, Einstein, Schrödin-
ger… from their philosophy of 
knowledge and of science? As 
a matter of fact, in the mind of 
most managers of science, this 
critique of philosophy covers 
also the theoretical aspects of 
science, as they always border 
each other. So, government’s 
policies in financing science 
must be justified by their role in 
solving the country’s problems 
and by their accountable econo-
mic fall-out—stated the French 
Cour des Comptes (the consti-
tutional Accounting Agency) 
a few years ago. In either case, 
science, with no philosophy, is 
viewed as applied problem sol-
ving, with immediate or short 
term economic results. This 
misses the actual role and history 
of culture and science, which 
radically modified the human 
condition. Science and culture 
crucially contributed, often by 
“enabling” in a highly unpredic-
table way and in changing eco-
nomic and social contexts, the 
dynamics of our societies.
Going back to birds, ornitho-
logy is the science of bird life 
and evolution; it is then analog 
to knowledge and reflections on 
human condition and history. 
Then, the difference between 
birds and humans is exactly that 
birds do not have ornithology, 
while we have “humanology”, 
that is humanities and a theory 
of human evolution (or natural 
sciences, more generally)
BIBLIOMETRICS AND 
DEMOCRACY
Managers continually solve pro-
blems that are posed to them, of 
any kind. They have a general 
training that teaches them how 
to solve problems in any context, 
by referring to a unique, univer-
sal theory: the “common sense” 
theory.
Today, managers stepped into 
science by solving a fundamen-
tal problem: how to evaluate 
science? how to finance it? So 
they used the common sense 
theory: by asking the vote of the 
majority of scientists, in each 
discipline. This vote is expressed 
by the number of quotations and 
by the impact factors of journals, 
based on the (average) number 
of quotations in the two years 
following publication. Isn’t this 
a undebatable and effective use 
of democracy? Since this poll, 
in comparative evaluations, is 
directly and indirectly expressed 
by counting quotations, it is, 
allegedly, a rigorous, expres-
sion of a majority consensus on 
scientific content. It is objective.
Now, democracy is grounded on 
two fundamental principles: the 
government by a majority and 
the possibility for a minority to 
propose alternative policies, to 
explore new or different ways of 
being together.
The formation of scientific 
thinking is a delicate process. 
Science is the interplay between 
these two fundamental aspects 
of democracy. When some 
major theory becomes common 
sense, then the novelty will pop 
out against this common sense 
framework, by a disagreement 
with the main frame theory. 
This has been so since the for-
mation of Greek science, then 
with the modern scientific revo-
lution and further on with the 
xxth-century radical changes of 
perspective, in Physics, Mathe-
matics, Biology. The formation 
of scientific knowledge is always 
against ‘common sense’ (Bache-
lard, 1940).
Also in everyday work and in 
relation to existing theories, a 
scientific thinker always starts 
by an “unsatisfaction”. In mathe-
matics, say, facing a problem, the 
relevant solution comes from 
saying first: the mathematical 
structures that are currently 
used for this or that are not the 
good ones, this is not the right 
theoretical approach, these are 
not the right tools… Then, the 
mathematician looks at mat-
ters from a, maybe slightly, but 
different perspective, in a new 
frame. Unsatisfaction helps in 
“making a step aside”, reflec-
ting critically on the current 
approaches, inventing new 
mathematical structures, maybe 
by minor variants of existing 
ones.
Critical thinking is at the core 
of scientific theoretizing: one 
has to step aside and look at the 
very principles of knowledge 
construction, as grounding the 
dominating way of thinking. 
And change fuels the his-
tory of science. We have to be 
constantly mobile, plastic, adap-
tive, able to get away from the 
dominating frame. But also an 
engineer, who has had a good 
theoretical and critical training, 
may face a technical problem 
posed to him/her, by proposing 
a new point a view, by approa-
ching it in a new way, away from 
the intended applied frame or 
theory and, by this, he/she may 
invent an unexpected solution. 
On the theoretical side, a way 
for enhancing a critique of lea-
ding knowledge principles and 
exploring new scientific pers-
pectives, may be obtained by 
crossing boundaries, comparing 
foundations and by an explicit 
philosophical commitment in 
natural sciences (Bailly, Longo, 
2011; Longo, Montévil, 2013).
Critical thinking is the funda-
mental component of minority 
thinking: it implies disagree-
ment with respect to the main-
frame theory, the common sense 
theory. This forces science to 
relate to democracy by relying 
first on the minority side, by the 
proposal of new ways of unders-
tanding, of acting, of moving 
ahead. And this is so also in 
the ordinary research activity, 
possibly by minor changes of 
perspective; otherwise it is not 
scientific research. Sometimes, 
rarely, changes are revolutionary; 
always, they enrich knowledge 
and prepare revolutions.
Of course, one may work in 
the “majority theory”, but the 
novelty, the new idea, even 
within that theory, will always 
require a change of insight that 
will bring the proponent on 
a critical side, possibly a new 
minority side, more or less away 
from the main frame. History 
of science teaches us that the 
opinion of the majority has 
always been on the wrong side, 
at each moment of the formation 
of new scientific thinking. One 
does not need to refer only to 
the most quoted turning points, 
such as the modern scientific 
revolution, as it was so also for 
the early approaches to biological 
evolution (Buffon, Lamarck), 
or for differential geometry 
and the various branches 
of physics invented in the 
xixth century (thermodynamics, 
electromagnetism, statistical 
physics). Gauss was “scared” 
to present his ideas on non-
euclidean geometry and did not 
make them public for decades. 
Riemann and Helmholtz were 
litterally insulted by award 
winner E. Dühring, elected by 
influential majorities in 1872, 
about 20 years after Riemann’s 
fundamental writings on 
differential geometry. Poincaré’s 
geometry of non-linear systems 
was largely ignored for about 
60 years, till the 1950s, when 
theories of deterministic chaos 
were brought to the limelight by 
Kolmogorof and Lorentz. Some 
work I recently studied, Turing’s 
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seminal paper on morphogenesis 
(1952), had little or no followers 
for about 20 years! An early 
revitalization can be found in 
(Fox-Keller, Segel, 1970).
These are not exceptions: this 
is how scientific thought is 
formed. The exception is when 
an innovative theory is quickly 
accepted: Einstein’s Relativity 
is probably the unique case of 
a rapid success and diffusion 
of a novel approach. I am not 
expressing by this the romantic 
myth of the isolated, revolutio-
nary scientist. These revolutions 
or novelties are always made 
possible by and within strong 
scientific schools. The modern 
scientific revolution matured 
in the intellectually very lively 
context of Italian Renaissance. 
It crossed the invention of the 
perspective in painting, a new 
organization of human space, 
including, later, the spaces of 
astronomy (van Fraassen, 1970; 
Angelini, Lupacchini, 2013; 
Longo, 2011). Naturalism origi-
nated then by a new way of loo-
king at phenomena and at our 
humanity, by inventing a new 
metaphysics, from Leonardo’s 
drawings to Nicolas Cusanus’s 
proposal of an “infinite universe” 
(Zellini, 2005). These processes 
always required a change of 
viewpoint, with respect to the 
official theory, also within an 
excellent school, yet against that 
very school.
Galileo, in his youth, worked on 
the “physics of Hell”, (Galilei, 
1588), a possible path towards 
the “naturalization” of a reli-
gious ontology and, by this, of 
knowledge. As a matter of 
fact, a common fashion, in the 
xvith century, was, for excellent 
physicists and mathematicians, 
the heirs of Pacioli, Cardano 
and Bombelli, to solve the many 
problems posed by the material 
structure of Hell. Galileo tur-
ned one of these problems into 
a seminal theory, that is into 
science.2
This juvenile work gave Galileo 
a sufficient bibliometric index to 
get tenure in Pisa in 1589, when 
he stopped working on the 
Hell and, some time later, got 
in touch with Kepler. Tenure is 
fundamental to allow free thin-
king, even though, in some his-
torical contexts, it may be insuf-
ficient to protect this freedom, 
when the novel theoretical pro-
posal is too audacious, too much 
against the main stream - and 
minority thinking, thus scienti-
fic thinking, is not allowed to go 
beyond certain metaphysical or 
political limits.
In this case and in all the others 
I mentioned above, the new 
theoretical frame does emerge 
within a strong scientific school 
and a relatively free debate - it 
is allowed to emerge as long as 
the novelty does not contradict 
a dominating metaphysics. Yet, 
even within a school, the further 
change is due to a few who dare 
to go further, or, more precisely, 
to think differently. It is the 
school that produces the pos-
sibility of thinking deeply and 
differently; it is not a matter of 
isolated individualities.
We have to promote schools, 
but their strength will reside 
also or mostly in the amount 
of freedom they allow to side-
track approaches. No one could 
think freely in Soviet Union, 
except in Mathematics and in 
Theoretical Physics (but not in 
Biology) within the Academy 
of Sciences. And remarkable 
and original work, in Mathema-
tics and Physics, was produced 
in that singular context. Some, 
local, space of dissent may suf-
fice for science, if circumstances 
allow (for example, the social 
privileges accorded to scientists 
in the Soviet Union-SU). But 
dissent is needed for science.
Bibliometrics is the apparently 
“democratic” analog of the 
Church’s dominating metaphy-
sics in the xviith century or the 
Party’s truth in the SU. These 
rulers were not elected, but 
other majority rulers were elec-
ted, such as Hitler or Salazar. It 
suffices then to kill the opposing 
ideas and democracy looses its 
meaning - and science disap-
pears, like in Germany after 
1933. The majority vote, per se, 
is not democracy. Democracy 
requires also and crucially the 
enablement or even the pro-
motion of a thinking and active 
minority. Bibliometrics forbids 
minority thinking, where new 
scientific ideas always occur by 
definition, as history teaches us. 
If a scientist has to write on top 
of his/her CV his/her bibliome-
tric indices, that is the evalua-
tion by the majority of scientists 
of his/her work, and present it 
in all occasions, this will pre-
vent the search for a different 
approach, to dare to explore a 
new path that may require 60, 
20 or 10 years to be quoted, as 
in the examples I gave above. 
And he/she is constantly pus-
hed to develop as much as pos-
sible technical tools in a familiar 
and well established theoretical 
frame, as they may allow others 
to write more papers, where the 
technique may be quoted.
We all need to be evaluated in 
science and severely so. But a 
new idea, an apparently absurd 
exploration may be accepted by 
a majority of two or three in a 
committee of three or five collea-
gues giving tenure. The success 
may require several applications, 
but the candidate with too origi-
nal ideas may finally encounter 
a small group of open minded 
colleagues, who do not look a 
priori at the bibliometric index, 
but dare to understand and eva-
luate contents. This also applies 
to publishing in good journals. 
If the editor does not care of 
the expected impact factor of 
the journal (a “next two years” 
quotation criterion!), but is able 
to find open minded referees, an 
apparently strange, non-sense 
or non-common sense idea 
may find its way to publication. 
So, after six or more attempts, 
even the 1971 seminal paper by 
Ruelle and Takens on chaotic 
dynamics could find a publisher, 
and, after several years of fai-
lures, in the 1990s, Gallese’s, 
Rizzolati’s and collaborators’ 
unexpected results on “Mirror 
Neurons” were at last published 
(see references)3. Both papers 
were too original to be imme-
diately accepted, yet a couple of 
audacious editors finally dared 
to publish them.
If, instead, each evaluation refers 
to a “global” majority vote, that 
is to the opinion expressed by 
the largest number of quota-
tions or expected quotations 
(the short term impact factor) 
by all scientists in the discipline 
on Earth, science is at the end. 
Or we will have a new form of 
techno-science, the one mana-
gers can easily judge and finance: 
short term problem solving and 
techniques within clearly esta-
blished frames, the problems 
that the majority in a discipline 
can easily understand, that even 
managers can grasp. But no 
radically new theory will ever 
pose its own, internal problems 
that cannot even be seen from 
the dominating perspective.
NETWORKS, DIVERSITY 
AND “THE NORM”
Computer networks give us 
a tool comparable to writing, 
another of our extraordinary 
inventions. They were both 
motivated by metaphysics and 
philosophy. In Mesopota-
mia, five thousands years ago, 
humans made visible the invi-
sible, language and thought, 
in a dialogue with the Gods, 
(Herrenschmidt, 2007). The 
human interaction was suddenly 
enriched by this new tool and 
by the magic of the permanent 
sign, thus the explicitly symbolic 
transmission of myths, history 
and knowledge. A new form of 
exchange modified our commu-
nicating community.
In the last century, Hilbert’s phi-
losophical questions, originating 
from his theory on the Foun-
dations of Mathematics, were 
answered by Gödel, Church, 
Kleene and Turing by propo-
sing Computability Theory and 
abstract Logical Computing 
Machines (Turing). Later, our 
interacting humanity connected 
concrete computing machines 
in networks and started a search 
SCIENCE, PROBLEM SOLVING AND BIBLIOMETRICS
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for suitable theories of this 
new level of communication. 
Networks, today’s computer 
networks in particular, allow 
mankind to access knowledge 
and memory of mankind, an 
extraordinary enhancement of 
our interactive thinking. We can 
access to diversity, collaborate at 
distance, appreciate differences, 
enrich cultures by endless 
hybridisations.
Yet, these networks may also 
be used also for “normalizing” 
humanity. They may be used for 
averaging everybody. Just force a 
unique criterion for “excellence”; 
replace the network structure by 
a totally ordered line of values, 
a uniform scale of points, the 
same for everybody. Then the 
networks’ richness in confron-
ting diversity may be used to 
forbid the variance from the 
imposed norm. Transform the 
network of exchange of Univer-
sity or of researchers into a total 
order, on the grounds of a few 
(often perfectly stupid or mana-
gerial) criteria, and diversity is 
lost.
Hybridisation and contamina-
tions are at the origin of most 
novelties in evolution, both bio-
logical and human or cultural 
evolution. But no hybridisation 
nor contamination is possible 
in absence of diversity, inclu-
ding the “hopeful monsters”, 
the wrong paths continually 
explored by phylogenesis, 
(Goldschmidt, 1940; Gould, 
1989). We have to accommo-
date errors, wrong paths, if we 
want diversity and, by it and 
within it, the novelty of science.
Self-appointed agencies of 
managers propose criteria and 
technical tools for averaging the 
world of knowledge, to norma-
lize thinking according to com-
mon sense values. We should 
oppose to this unique scale of 
values some sort of “index of 
diversity”. They are already used 
by biologists to assess the dyna-
mics of an ecosystem: when 
diversity decreases, the situa-
tion in general worsens, major 
extinctions happen or are expec-
ted. Diversity guarantees the 
ever changing dynamics that is 
essential to life and to human 
cultures. By normalizing evalua-
tions, forcing identity of aims, 
of metrics and, thus, of cultural 
contents, we are killing the per-
manent “variations on themes” 
as well as the radical changes in 
perspective that constitute the 
ever changing path of scientific 
knowledge.
Networks allow collaborations, 
today as never before. Yet, they 
may be used to force mainly 
competition on the grounds of 
fixed values and observables, 
by accounting criteria with no 
content. Competition is much 
easier, in science, than collabo-
ration. It may even be based on 
cheating, on announcing false 
results, declaring non existing 
experimental protocols, on stea-
ling results, organizing networks 
of reciprocal, yet fake quota-
tions. Collaboration instead is 
very hard: good scientists are 
very selective in accepting colla-
borators and diversity makes the 
dialogue difficult, while produ-
cing the most relevant novelties. 
A research activity mainly based 
on competing for projects and 
prizes, on competitive evalua-
tions, destroys the chances for 
open collaborations, closes the 
mind to the others. Occasio-
nally, we may need to compete 
for a job, a grant. The point is 
to avoid turning this inevitable 
fact of life into the main atti-
tude in scientific work, that is 
to make competition and nor-
malizing evaluations the driving 
force and the guidelines of our 
scientific activity, which instead 
should be based on collabora-
ting diversities.
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I
In recent years scientists have 
devoted increasing efforts to the 
study of morality. As neuros-
cientist Moll and his colleagues 
(2003, p. 299) say, “morality has 
been at the center of informal 
talks and metaphysical discus-
sions since the beginning of 
history. Recently, converging 
lines of evidence from evolu-
tionary biology, neuroscience 
and experimental psychology 
have shown that morality is 
grounded in the brain.” In this 
article I ask what exactly this 
new science of morality can 
and can’t claim to have discove-
red about morality; what it can 
and can’t tell us about morality 
on the basis of the work it has 
done. I argue that the object of 
study of much recent work is 
not morality, but a particular 
kind of individual moral judg-
ment. Most data and analyses 
are about something very spe-
cific: an individual’s judgment 
about the rightness, appropria-
teness, or permissibility of an 
action, made in response to a 
stimulus at a particular point 
in time. But this is a small and 
peculiar sample of morality, 
whose incidence in people’s 
actual moral lives is uncertain. 
There are many things that are 
moral, yet not moral judgments. 
There are also many things that 
are moral judgments, yet not of 
that particular kind. If moral 
things are various and diverse, 
then empirical research about 
one kind of individual moral 
judgment doesn’t warrant theo-
retical conclusions about mora-
lity in general—i.e., morality’s 
nature, functioning, origins, 
causes, or effects. If that kind of 
individual moral judgment is a 
peculiar and rare thing, then it 
is not obvious what it tells us 
about other moral things. What 
is more, it is not obvious what 
its theoretical importance is to 
begin with—i.e., why we should 
care about it at all. 
Thus, my arguments raise ques-
tions about the theoretical 
meaning and value of research 
about individual moral judg-
ment. My claim is not that the 
numerous new experimental 
findings about this object will 
necessarily turn out to be incon-
sequential or useless—that we 
can’t know at this point. But at 
present it’s not very clear what 
larger conclusions follow from 
them, nor what their implica-
tions for a scientific theory of 
morality are, much less what 
their practical or policy impli-
cations might be (if any). In 
this respect, the literature is rife 
with questionable claims and 
non sequiturs. Indeed, several 
recent papers seem unaware of 
the crucial distinction between 
individual moral judgment and 
morality, or contain problematic 
argumentative transitions from 
moral judgment to the ambi-
guous “moral decision-making.” 
In what follows, I begin by 
identifying what I call “moral 
judgment-centric approaches” 
(MJA), i.e., research approaches 
that have individual moral judg-
ment (MJ) at their methodolo-
gical center. Then, I spell out my 
claim that MJ is a peculiar moral 
thing and there’s much moral 
life beyond it. Last, I argue for 
a pluralism of methods and 
objects of inquiry in the scien-
tific investigation of morality, 
so that it transcends its proble-
matic overemphasis on a parti-
cular kind of individual moral 
judgment.
II
Scientists of morality have 
done a great deal of research 
that revolves around individuals 
making moral judgments. Sub-
jects may be in the lab, inside 
the scanner, or at home on their 
computer. In most studies they 
are healthy (or “normal”) per-
sons, but in some they have 
brain damage or a psychiatric 
condition. In a few studies their 
brain’s activity or chemistry has 
been manipulated, but in most 
it hasn’t. The subjects’ task is to 
make a moral judgment about 
statements or situations they 
are presented with. Oftentimes 
these studies elicit judgments 
specifically about moral dilem-
mas. That is, subjects are pre-
sented with a situation where 
two or more courses of action 
are possible, or, more often, a 
situation where the two alterna-
tives are doing a certain thing or 
abstaining from doing it. Then 
subjects are asked questions 
such as: Would it be permissible 
for person A to do action X in 
situation S1?; Would it be okay 
for you to do Y in S2?; or some-
thing along these lines. These 
answers are their moral judg-
ments. For example, “It is not 
permissible for A to do X in S1,” 
is a subject’s moral judgment. 
The most famous of these moral 
dilemmas is the “trolley pro-
blem,” originally crafted by phi-
losopher Philippa Foot (2002). 
But psychologists and neuros-
cientists have conducted experi-
ments using many other dilem-
mas, some of which they drew 
from the ethics literature, and 
some of which they expressly 
designed to manipulate variables 
of interest. For instance, Judith 
Thomson’s “loop” and “fat man” 
variants on the trolley problem; 
more recent reformulations by 
Marc Hauser and John Mikhail; 
Joshua Greene’s “crying baby” 
and “infanticide” dilemmas; in 
earlier moral psychology Kohl-
berg’s “Heinz dilemma” and “the 
captain’s dilemma”; and Jona-
than Haidt’s ingenious cases 
(although not dilemmas) about 
sex among siblings, eating one’s 
dog, or wiping the toilet with a 
national flag.
The research questions that these 
studies have sought to address 
are diverse, but some of the main 
ones are as follows. What brain 
areas are “activated”, “recruited,” 
“implicated,” “responsible for,” 
or “associated with” making 
moral judgments? What brain 
areas or circuits “subserve” parti-
cular kinds of moral judgments 
(e.g., deontological and conse-
quentialist ones)? What are 
the neural “correlates,” “basis,” 
“foundations,” “underpinnings,” 
or “substrates” of moral judg-
ment, decision-making, and 
emotions? What are the specific 
functional roles of specific brain 
areas? What causes individuals’ 
moral judgments: hot intuition, 
affect, and emotion, or rather 
cold reason and reasoning? Is 
there a moral faculty, organ, or 
universal grammar, comparable 
to the language faculty, organ, or 
universal grammar? 
What is common to most of 
these research projects, though, 
is that individual moral judg-
ment (MJ) is at their metho-
dological center. What subjects 
do is to make moral judgments. 
What researchers account for, 
predict, and find neural corre-
lates of are moral judgments. 
Indeed, the focus is not just on 
moral judgment, but on a speci-
fic kind of moral judgment. Its 
prototypical features as found in 
this literature are: 
• a moral judgment is made 
by and is an attribute of one 
individual 
• it’s made in response to a 
specific stimulus 
• the stimulus is an imaginary 
situation and a question about it
• the judgment is about an 
action (rather than, say, a person 
or state of affairs)
• a moral judgment is a state-
ment (indicative mood) 
• it is in essence an utterance 
or speech act (even if not in fact 
uttered)
• it makes use of “thin” ethical 
concepts only (okay, appropriate, 
permissible, acceptable, wrong, 
etc.)
• it’s fixed, settled, verdict-like
• it’s clear (not conceptually 
or semantically muddled, inco-
herent, etc.)
• it’s made at a specific, pre-
cise, discrete point in time 
I argue that MJ is a peculiar kind 
of moral thing, hence not a good 
sample of moral things. It’s one 
among the many moral things 
that are part of people’s moral 
lives. I further argue that there’s 
no reason to suppose that all of 
the members of the moral class 
work the same way. It follows 
that investigations about MJ—
what I call “moral judgment-
centric approaches” (MJA)—
don’t have the resources to 
make claims about the nature 
and functioning of morality as 
a whole. Evidently, what is and 
isn’t part of people’s moral lives 
is an empirical question, not an 
armchair one. Further, it can’t 
be answered unless you spe-
cify just what persons, because 
this seems to vary from society 
to society, as well as historical 
period, social class, age, gender, 
and many other variables. It’s 
also an empirical question whe-
ther, given a group of people, 
MJ is a relatively small part of 
their lives, or rather is a large or 
the largest one. My aim here is 
simply to make some sugges-
tions as to what other moral 
things there might be besides 
MJ. Future work—both empi-
rical investigations and retros-
pective reviews—should put my 
suggestions to test, and specify 
where, to whom, and to what 
extent they apply (if at all). At 
this stage, plausibility is their 
main test. 
So, what else might there be? 
Two kinds of things: (i) things 
that are moral, or reasonably 
called “moral,” yet not moral 
judgments; and (ii) things that 
are moral judgments, yet not 
of the particular MJ kind—i.e., 
they don’t meet one or more 
of the above conditions. In the 
next section I suggest some 
distinctions that compare and 
contrast the MJA picture with 
what it leaves out of sight. Even 
before the empirical evidence 
comes in, I believe that leaving 
these things out of morality by 
fiat, without a convincing argu-
ment, is unacceptable. But this is 
precisely what MJA have done. 
III
In the recent empirical work, 
MJ is conceived of as a declara-
tive sentence. I argue that moral 
questions and exhortations are 
different from judgments in 
theoretically important respects. 
Consider these three types of 
sentences: (i) Declarative: It is 
morally permissible/right for 
A to Φ; (ii) Interrogative: Is it 
morally permissible/right for A 
to Φ? / What ought A to do, 
morally speaking?; (iii) Impera-
tive: Φ! / You must/ought to Φ! 
Not only is MJ conceived of as a 
declarative sentence in the indi-
cative mood, such as sentences 
of type (i). I think it’s also assu-
med that moral judgments are 
in essence utterances or speech 
acts. Even if in practice subjects 
check boxes, push buttons, or 
left-click, they would be prepa-
red to utter something like (i) 
under the appropriate speech-
act conditions. 
I argue that, besides judgments, 
one component of people’s 
moral lives may be questions, 
including but not limited to 
questions such as (ii). These 
questions people pose to and 
about other people in ordinary 
conversations and personal 
ruminations, and, perhaps more 
importantly, to and about them-
selves. Moral questions may or 
may not lead to answers, such as 
the MJ that the experimenter’s 
or survey researcher’s question 
leads to. Sometimes they may 
remain unanswered, yet still 
function as tentative guides to 
thought and action, because they 
suggest what’s important, wor-
risome, worth thinking about. 
Or they may remain unanswe-
red without really guiding any-
thing—just obstinately live on 
in one’s mind. Phenomenolo-
gically, the experience of having 
or posing or struggling with 
a moral question is arguably a 
distinct one, and surely much 
unlike uttering a moral judg-
ment. Thus, moral questions are 
a distinct kind of moral phe-
nomenon, worth attending to 
in and of themselves. Consider 
a few more concrete examples. 
Should I regularly give money 
to charity? Why would I not 
eat meat if I like it? Why would 
someone who likes eating meat 
not eat it? Is it wrong for me to 
have an abortion? Is she a good 
spouse? Why am I doing what 
I’m doing with my life? What’s 
really important to me? Is life 
fair to me? Is he such-and-such 
kind of person? 
Moral exhortations—sen-
tences (iii) above—seem to be 
yet another kind of empirical 
phenomenon and work in yet 
another way. Your saying to 
your friend, “Don’t lie to your 
spouse!,” is presumably based on 
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a judgment, belief, conviction, 
or feeling to the effect that it’d 
be morally wrong or bad for her 
to lie to him (for the sake of the 
argument, I set aside non-moral 
reasons she might have). Besides 
exhortations, there’s also what 
one might call self-exhorta-
tions—e.g., “Let me improve 
this aspect of my life!,” or “I 
really shouldn’t do that thing 
anymore!” They, too, are pres-
umably based on some sort of 
judgment to the effect that that 
is a morally bad thing to have or 
do. However, neither exhorta-
tions nor self-exhortations seem 
reducible to or understandable 
in terms of the judgments that 
apparently underlie them. For 
one, as empirical phenomena, 
exhortations and judgments 
don’t look alike at all. Nor does 
the first-person experience, 
phenomenologically speaking. 
Conceptually, they have a dif-
ferent aim, job, or point; assu-
ming speech, a different speech 
act. Although exhortations 
implicitly or explicitly contain 
theoretical evaluations, their 
point is practical in a straight-
forward and unmediated man-
ner: they try to bring about a spe-
cific thing. Morality—however 
defined or understood—seems 
to have to do primarily with 
practice and action, and only 
secondarily or derivatively with 
theory about practice and action 
(more on this below). In this 
respect, exhortations fare better 
than judgments, whose practical 
aim is less direct. Why are moral 
judgments but not exhortations 
empirically studied? 
Finally, there are narratives. As 
extensive literatures in socio-
logy, psychology, anthropology, 
history, and communication 
have shown, human beings are 
narrative creatures. People tell 
stories about themselves and 
about others, about their lives 
and identities, about their com-
munity, its past and its origins. 
For our purposes, it’s important 
that narratives can’t be decom-
posed or analyzed into a set of 
judgments, rules, points, argu-
ments, questions, or thoughts. A 
narrative’s meaning is tied to its 
unity. The meaning of one part 
depends on its relationship to 
the meaning of other parts—
much like indexicals, networks, 
and relational properties in 
general. Some particular types 
of narratives, such as fables, 
conclude with a moral or a 
rule of conduct. Yet, again, it’s 
unclear what the moral’s mea-
ning would be, were its narra-
tive context to disappear, and 
thus the moral remained as a 
self-standing sentence. Along 
these lines, you could argue 
that all real-life moral judg-
ments are embedded in a nar-
rative context—isolated moral 
judgments never occur, or even 
aren’t possible at all. Similarly, 
you could raise these empirical 
questions about people’s moral 
lives: Do they go about making 
independent judgments about 
things, one after the other? Or, 
rather, do they go about concoc-
ting and telling stories and bits 
of stories, to make sense of 
things and weave them together, 
and in the context of which they 
morally evaluate things? 
IV
I’d like now to consider what 
MJA might be neglecting in 
light of three traditional dis-
tinctions in moral philosophy: 
(i) the right v. the good v. the 
virtuous; (ii) permissible v. obli-
gatory v. supererogatory; and 
(iii) ethics of doing v. ethics of 
being. As mentioned above, MJ 
are about what it’d be “okay,” 
“appropriate,” “wrong,” “morally 
wrong,” “permissible,” “morally 
permissible,” or “morally accep-
table” for someone to do. These 
are the concepts that the expe-
rimental tasks employ. All of 
these questions try to get at 
some undoubtedly relevant 
moral things: rightness, accep-
tability, permissibility, “okay-
ness,” etc. Yet, might they all 
be missing some other relevant 
moral things? Perhaps in some 
societies questions about wron-
gness and permissibility are pro-
minent in some people’s moral 
lives. The practical significance 
of the concepts of rightness, 
wrongness, permissibility, and 
impermissibility in contempo-
rary Western societies is evident, 
for example, in their ubiqui-
tous institutional and cultural 
incarnations. Besides, as a mat-
ter of fact, these concepts have 
had an elective affinity with a 
particular form: rules or law-like 
principles. 
However, there is a different 
sort of moral relationship that 
people can have to things—
viz., finding them not morally 
right but morally good, either 
in themselves, or as means to 
further moral ends. You can say 
that people are after these moral 
goods, even when they lack a 
plan as to how to get them and 
this is a matter of practical sense. 
These are things that someone 
may hold dear; they aren’t her 
mere desires and preferences, but 
things she finds worthy of being 
had, desired, preferred, sought, 
cherished, or chosen. People 
seem to have moral projects, 
hopes, aspirations, ideals, and 
commitments, where goods and 
“the good” play the key role. 
Some examples of goods of 
diverse types are: liberty, truth, 
knowledge, community, solida-
rity, faith, health, wealth, honor, 
pleasure, excellence, love, family, 
friendship, security, ataraxia, 
work, self-expression. Further, 
there is a plurality of goods and 
of conceptions of the good, even 
within a single moral commu-
nity, which at times are incom-
mensurable. Moreover, besides 
doing what’s right and avoiding 
what’s wrong, people may wish 
to live a good, fulfilling, life; live 
it well, not misspend it. Some 
people might even have one 
project or commitment that is 
the most important of all. For 
example: have a family, write 
a novel, become rich, help the 
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poor, find God, fight against evil, 
reach a state of contentment and 
serenity, or bring about the revo-
lution. None of these things are 
encompassed by the concepts 
of rightness and permissibility; 
MJA are blind to them. 
Nor do these concepts encom-
pass the moral relationship 
of admiration, and the class 
of acts known as supereroga-
tory. When presented with 
morally extraordinary people, 
acts, or states of affairs, people 
may feel or express admira-
tion. Consider the lives of the 
saints and the heroes. Their 
acts are obviously permis-
sible and obviously not obli-
gatory. But that doesn’t help 
us describe and account for 
how people seem to react and 
relate to them. The same can 
be said about abhorrent, abo-
minable, and despicable acts 
and people. The experience 
and social consequences of the 
morally admirable/heroic and 
despicable/monstrous don’t 
seem understandable in the 
same terms as the good/bad, 
much less the right/wrong. 
They are not quantitatively 
more intense, but qualitatively 
different. 
I’ve suggested that MJA miss 
the good and the superero-
gatory completely or almost 
completely. I believe it doesn’t 
cover, either, people’s judg-
ments about character, virtue, 
and, more generally, what some 
ethicists call “ethics of being.” It 
seems that sometimes people’s 
moral judgments, questions, 
and experiences are not about 
what to do, but about what or 
how to be. Someone may be 
referred to as a bad, good, self-
absorbed, vain, generous, fair, 
open-minded, or irresponsible 
person. Or as someone who 
has guts, or is depraved, or sly, 
or manipulative, which in turn 
may become reasons for action 
(e.g., “I decided not to engage 
in business with Jones, because 
he’s an irresponsible fellow”; or, 
“Try to help him if you can—
he’s a good man”). Interestingly, 
these judgments about being 
are presumably based, inducti-
vely, on individual instances of 
doing. But they are nonetheless 
not reducible to them. Moreo-
ver, there is a sort of stickiness 
to judgments about being or 
character, precisely because they 
are seen as referring to relati-
vely stable traits or dispositions. 
Indeed, a judgment about how 
someone is might shape future 
instances of judgment about 
what they do. In addition, moral 
judgments and questions about 
yourself, and moral exhortations 
to yourself, may come in the 
language of being and charac-
ter, not in the language of doing. 
You may hope and strive to be 
an honest, courageous, pious, 
or respectful person, without 
it being possible to translate 
this into a set of concrete and 
exhaustive judgments, prin-
ciples, or action-maxims. Your 
moral self-conception or iden-
tity—what kind of person you 
see yourself as, what kind of 
person you hope to become, 
who are your moral heroes and 
antiheroes—is missed by talk 
about right, wrong, permissible, 
and forbidden, which is what 
MJA investigate. 
Furthermore, you may be unable 
(or unwilling) to bracket the fact 
that moral life and moral action 
are (1) the moral life and moral 
action of particular people, 
which (2) necessarily take place 
within a context. As it’s been 
often observed, agent-neutral 
ethical theories such as utili-
tarianism fail to take this into 
account. So does a methodo-
logical approach such as MJA. 
To return to the example of the 
trolley-problem experiments, 
without any (social, cultural, 
religious, legal) context, it might 
be hard for subjects to decide 
what the right thing to do is, or 
even to find the question mea-
ningful and see its point at all. 
“Well, it really, really depends,” 
they may think to themselves. In 
addition, subjects may wonder 
whether the fat man to be sacri-
ficed for the greatest good of 
the greatest number is an HIV/
AIDS researcher who may dis-
cover a cure for it, or a ruthless 
Uruguayan dictator. Not being 
analytic philosophers, subjects 
may ask themselves: what in 
the world does it mean that he 
is nobody in particular—neither 
a medical researcher nor a dic-
tator, neither kind nor unkind, 
neither old nor young? 
I’ve been making some empiri-
cal conjectures about ordinary 
people’s moral lives, and spe-
cifically whether MJA may be 
missing some of its components. 
I have not been talking about 
the academic field of moral 
philosophy and its normative 
and metaethical debates. Yet, 
many of my points have mutatis 
mutandis a counterpart in moral 
philosophy. For instance, if the 
good ought to have priority over 
the right, if the “law concep-
tion of ethics” is misguided, if 
Kantians can accommodate the 
concept of the supererogatory, 
if utilitarians can accommodate 
the concepts of identity and 
integrity. More precisely, many 
of my points have a counterpart 
in several strands of criticisms 
leveled at mainstream analytic 
ethics. This is not a mere coin-
cidence. For MJA’s conception 
of morality heavily draws on the 
particular conception of mora-
lity that consequentialism and 
deontology share, yet which is 
not shared by other traditions. 
For instance, a pragmatist, exis-
tentialist, communitarian, par-
ticularist, Buddhist, or virtue 
ethicist would probably see the 
disputes between consequenti-
alism and deontology as point-
less. Today’s scientists of mora-
lity have framed their question 
and modeled their object of 
inquiry after these two schools, 
thereby unwittingly taking sides 
on a substantive issue in ethics. 
V
In this paper I’ve asked what 
moral judgment-centric 
approaches (MJA) in psycho-
logy and neuroscience tell us 
about morality. I’ve argued that 
their object of study, MJ, is not 
a good sample of moral things. 
There are many things that are 
moral, yet not moral judgments. 
There are also many things that 
are moral judgments, yet not 
of the particular MJ kind (as 
defined above). If these argu-
ments are correct, it follows that 
MJA research doesn’t license 
theoretical conclusions about 
morality in general. Rather, it 
only licenses conclusions about 
the specific moral object it has 
actually investigated. To be sure, 
many suggestive experimental 
findings about this object have 
been reported. But I don’t think 
enough thought has been given 
to what to make of them theo-
retically, what social phenomena 
they illuminate, what neural cor-
relates are correlates of, or what 
to do with these findings to 
build a satisfactory understan-
ding of morality. To be sure, the 
new science of morality is still 
in its infancy. But that doesn’t 
make unwarranted or unclear 
claims any more acceptable. 
Here a pluralist approach 
would argue that if morality 
is made up of many different 
kinds of things, then a compel-
ling science of morality should 
consider all of them as objects 
of inquiry, and take them all into 
account when making claims 
about what morality is or how 
morality works. Because they 
are different kinds of things, 
they call for different questions 
and methods. Further, they may 
yield theoretical claims that 
aren’t subsumable under a single, 
comprehensive theory of mora-
lity, or parsimonious principle 
about the nature of morality. At 
least, you shouldn’t start with 
the assumptions that: (a) there 
is one such theory or principle; 
and (b) there is a basic micro-
unit, common to all moral 
things. 
I think such pluralist view is on 
the right track. Whatever the 
theoretical meaning and value 
of MJA findings turn out to be, 
they are about and shed light 
on one particular kind of moral 
thing. In order to make claims 
about morality in general, many 
other objects must be included. 
And many other methods must 
be used: psychological and neu-
roscientific, as well as anthro-
pological, historical, and socio-
logical. For example, for certain 
research questions there’s no 
way around the ethnographic 
observation of action and inte-
raction in their natural setting. 
For certain research questions 
there’s no way around statisti-
cally representative surveys of 
a population. If you intend to 
use scientific knowledge about 
morality to make practical 
recommendations to policy-
makers, then an organizational 
analysis is unavoidable—indi-
vidual-level differences may be 
inconsequential or even irrele-
vant. In some social situations, 
it’s not individuals’ automatic 
intuitions or reactions to stimuli, 
but deliberation and debate that 
carry the day regarding what 
ends up being done and even 
what ends up being believed and 
felt by those very individuals. 
Similarly, if you’re interested in 
moral narratives, you’ll have to 
patiently listen to them or read 
them, give people some time and 
freedom to express themselves, 
and figure out their meanings. 
In sum, I believe that there is 
neither a single best method 
to study morality, nor a single 
object of inquiry on the basis 
of which to make claims about 
morality. Nor is there a single 
path toward an understanding 
or theory of morality. There-
fore, a plurality of theoretical 
and methodological approaches 
should coexist, each aware of 
its strengths, but also of its 
partial perspective and limited 
scope. In practice, there should 
be more variation in objects of 
inquiry and methods. Individual 
judgment about rightness and 
wrongness is one among many 
objects of inquiry scientists of 
morality need to do research on; 
so are moral questions, ques-
tions about good rather than 
right, questions about being 
rather than doing, thick judg-
ments, narratives, institutions, 
and behavior in natural settings. 
Neuroimaging and experimental 
methods are two among many 
methods scientists of morality 
need to use; so are surveys, eth-
nographic observation, and the 
history of moral concepts and 
practices. 
In these respects, moral psy-
chologists and neuroscientists 
can benefit from more engage-
ment with historians, anthro-
pologists, and sociologists of 
morality. Certainly, in one sense 
it’s entirely sensible that there 
be a division of labor between, 
say, neuroscience, sociology, and 
history. However, this division 
of labor entails two perils. First, 
it’s a consistent historical pat-
tern that scientific disciplines 
tend to forget the incomple-
teness of their standpoint and 
disregard findings that don’t fit 
with their approach. Second, 
some of the phenomena and 
processes of interest to a science 
of morality can’t be broken 
into separate parts—e.g., the 
social and the neural—because 
these parts mutually influence 
or even constitute each other. 
Hence, studying them sepa-
rately may lead to misleading 
results. Unfortunately, a pluralist 
science of morality entails costs, 
too. First, its accounts and theo-
ries are unlikely to be simple 
and parsimonious, much like 
other versions of methodologi-
cal, explanatory, and ontological 
pluralism in science. Second, 
as in politics, this sort of plu-
ralism is time-consuming and 
hard to realize. For it requires 
interactions among people who 
differ not just in the content of 
their answers, but in the form of 
the questions they ask, and in 
the questions they find worth 
asking to begin with. Yet, just as 
in politics, this might still be the 
best way to prevent oversights 
and build a robust scientific 
understanding of morality, not 
just of a particular kind of indi-
vidual moral judgment.

WHAT THE SCIENCE OF MORALITY DOESN’T SAY ABOUT MORALITY
I argue that the object of study of much recent work is not morality, but 
a particular kind of individual moral judgment. But this is a small and 
peculiar sample of morality. There are many things that are moral, yet not 
moral judgments. There are also many things that are moral judgments, 
yet not of that particular kind.
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Following the Mediterra-
nean coastline driving west 
out of Marseille about 30km, 
one reaches the beginning of 
one of France’s largest indus-
trial regions. The Fos-sur-mer/
Etang de Berre area is home 
to almost 430 installations, 
including: chemical plants, oil 
refineries, natural gas facilities, 
and steel production. The Fos-
Lavera-Berre chemical park, 
for example, prides itself in 
being the largest in southern 
Europe, producing 40% of all 
French-produced ethylene and 
60% of butadiene not to men-
tion the adjacent oil port, one of 
the biggest in the world, which 
supports a local network of refi-
neries. This impressive assem-
blage of industry belches out 
tons of toxic air pollutants, cau-
sing an eerie yellow-brown veil 
over the region and the sunsets 
to be other-worldly, particularly 
when the mistral winds are still.
The region also has incredible 
beauty. It extends for more 
than 50km from the airport at 
Vitrolles past the picturesque 
Etang be Berre lagoon to the 
wetlands of the Camargue, wes-
tern Europe’s largest river delta 
and home to over 400 species 
of birds. The inland industrial 
region extends northward to 
the Crau, an expansive allu-
vial fan and important pasture 
lands for sheep and cattle since 
ancient times. The area is also 
home to about 400,000 people 
living in 30 towns throughout 
the vast hybrid landscape. What 
lies beneath this mixture of 
beauty and dread—the sacred 
and the profane—is a sense of 
underlying unease and appre-
hension about the impact of 
pollution on human health. It 
is an awkward mélange of wan-
ting to know, of not wanting to 
know, of suspecting knowing, 
but feeling disempowered or 
afraid to act.
Understanding this public 
malaise requires understanding 
the calculus of environmental 
power in the region: namely 
who has authority over the land, 
the air, and the water. In 1965 a 
law was passed demarcating the 
coastal part of this region as the 
Autonomous Port of Marseille 
now called the Grand Maritime 
Port of Marseille (GPMM), 
the largest port in France. Its 
reach encompasses, not only 
the actual port of Marseille, 
but includes the ports and adja-
cent land extending through 
Fos-sur-mer all the way to the 
mouth of the Rhône, including 
the town of Port-St-Louis. 
The GPMM designation has 
had a significant impact on the 
towns of this region as the law 
effectively removed all deci-
sion-making authority from the 
citizens and their elected offi-
cials and transferred it to the 
state—specifically the public-
private partnership that com-
prises the GPMM.
In the last 12 years, the two 
largest controversies over the 
siting of new hazardous facili-
ties in the region happened in 
the port town of Fos-sur-mer: 
1) the siting of a large Gaz de 
France LNG terminal on the 
Fos public beach (opened 2005) 
and, 2) an incinerator designed 
to burn all the garbage of Mar-
seille, the second largest city in 
France (opened 2010). These 
were hugely unpopular projects 
in the eyes of the Fos and other 
nearby residents and served 
to catalyze the environmen-
tal community. On the face of 
it, the controversies were more 
about power (or lack thereof ) 
and environmental degrada-
tion than about human health. 
However, the debates did 
prompt residents to ask ques-
tions that were present but not 
previously vocalized: what were 
the combination emissions 
from all the local polluting faci-
lities doing to their health?
To situate the environmental 
health quest in an illumina-
ting framework, it is helpful 
to know something about the 
recently growing research field, 
the sociology of ignorance, 
which is also called, the social 
construction of non-knowledge. 
Ignorance, is not what is not 
studied or a byproduct of 
science—ignorance is actively 
produced and is shaped by the 
social, scientific, and political 
institutions themselves. The 
study of non-knowledge, there-
fore, is a view into the values and 
cultural biases at work in scien-
tific knowledge practices. The 
ways in which non-knowledge 
can be actively constructed are 
many, but in the case of envi-
ronmental health data, there are 
two common forms. The first is 
the production of vast amounts 
of uninterpreted data presented 
as an impenetrable wall of 
numbers, basically insuring the 
publics’ dependence on state 
experts. Or conversely, the over-
aggregation of data that can be 
used to either, show nothing 
(i.e. “no effect”), or to argue for 
continued expert studies until 
something can be known.
Following are some examples 
in the case of Fos. In the case 
of the incinerator siting contro-
versy, the local associations 
fighting the project were given 
volumes of technical data about 
the proposed installation. It 
was an overwhelming amount 
of information and it was diffi-
cult for the citizens to ascertain 
exactly what the environmental 
and health impacts were. Alter-
natively, data over-aggrega-
tion is the norm in the various 
French agencies and associa-
tions tasked with collecting and 
monitoring health statistics. 
From cancer to asthma, health 
statistics are revealed to the 
public covering such large geo-
graphic areas, that it is impos-
sible for a town to know if their 
health is adversely impacted 
by their adjacency to polluting 
industries.
Ignorance is also actively pro-
duced through institutional 
norms, pressures, rules, and 
logics.1 Disciplinary cultures 
have preferences for doing 
health science certain ways and 
not others. This can reinforce 
non-knowledge, but it can also 
thwart non-traditional ways of 
doing science to insure that the 
knowledge remains unknown. 
One example of the institutio-
nal shaping of knowledge gaps 
is the recent study conducted 
by the Agence Régionale de 
Santé (ARS). These scientists 
were committed to, and had the 
support of, local environmen-
tal activists in trying to answer 
the industrial zone residents’ 
questions regarding illness in 
their neighborhoods. The study 
tracked hospital admittance as 
the measure to assess the rate 
of cancer, asthma, and car-
diac illness. To understand the 
prevalence of asthma or the 
incidence of cancer in a town, 
hospital admittance is not the 
best measure because a hos-
pital stay is typically for the 
most extreme asthma attack or 
advanced stages of certain can-
cers. Hospital admission num-
bers, however, were the data 
that the ARS scientists could 
more easily obtain given the 
fact that public health data on 
these kinds of illnesses were not 
readily available. Thus ease of 
acquisition and cost considera-
tions circumscribed the study 
that was possible.
In the end, the study showed 
no higher rates of hospital 
admission for either asthma 
or most cancers for residents 
living in the industrial region. 
The citizens were unhappy with 
the study as their primary ques-
tions remained unanswered: 
what are the rates of incidence 
of illness of those living closest 
to industry? The scientists 
explained that they regretted 
they could not answer the right 
questions. They explained that 
the availability of data was the 
problem. For example, while 13 
regions in France have a cancer 
registry, this region does not. 
Additionally, while elevated 
rates of pediatric cancer would 
be an important indicator of 
environmental health impacts, 
this data is only maintained, in 
aggregate, at the larger regional 
level. And finally, the state-fun-
ded scientists were unable to 
study auto-immune and related 
diseases, such as diabetes type 
1, as there is no classification 
for such diseases in the nume-
rous data collection institutions 
in France. Even though many 
medical professionals believe 
these kinds of illness are envi-
ronmentally triggered, state 
data collection is more focused 
on illnesses with large econo-
mic impact, thus auto-immune 
and related disease incidence 
rates remain unknown. These 
collection and classification 
norms form organisationally 
determined domains of unrea-
lized knowledge, and this non-
knowledge flows from one 
government domain to ano-
ther and eventually reaches the 
public whose basic questions 
continue to be unanswered.
In the case of the residents of 
Fos, there is yet another kind 
of non-knowledge produced. 
This could be called “subverting 
the question” or non-answering 
though the rubric of risk. The 
citizens have questions such 
as: how prevalent is the respi-
ratory illnesses and cancer in 
their town, or what is the health 
impact of the large variety of 
toxins in their air? Instead of 
attempting to answer these 
questions in a way that includes, 
and hopefully, satisfies the resi-
dents, the state funds numerous 
technical risk studies. Pollution 
exposure is then categorized by 
such terms as: exposure base-
lines, threshold values, emission 
profiles, and biomarker persis-
tence. “The local people found 
these studies very strange”, 
according to one public health 
official, “and did not know why 
they were conducted.” Another 
spokesperson for a local mayor 
concurred and added, “many 
residents say that the right 
things were not studied as there 
were no studies begun from 
a human perspective, not just 
calculating risk using threshold 
values as people will not trust 
these studies—because they say 
they are certainly sick.”
The shape of knowledge absence 
as it intersects with the spa-
tial and political geography of 
west Provence can be mapped 
onto specific historical, social, 
and organisational contexts.2 
From the absolute power of the 
GPMM to the back office of 
a state bureaucrat determining 
health classification categories, 
the topography of ignorance 
takes complex and consequen-
tial shapes. In the case of the 
Fos/Etang residents, it may 
require thinking outside of the 
box—using new health study 
methods not yet recognized by 
state experts. It may be time for 
not only the people’s questions 
to be at the center of a study, 
but for the people themselves 
to be asked: what is your health 
status? This kind of lay science 
which uses local voices and 
their health responses as data 
might finally be able to answer 
the questions that two decades 
of state studies have yet to 
address.
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Are States in contemporary 
Europe driven to enforce new 
forms of territorial convergence 
under the impact of economic 
crisis, enhanced European stee-
ring and international moni-
toring? Or is the evolution of 
sub-national governance lar-
gely driven by endogenous 
pressures? This very significant 
research question get to the 
heart of contemporary Euro-
pean States through a focus on 
the interplay between territorial 
capacities, domestic veto players 
and exogenous constraints. The 
article reports interim findings 
from a research project suppor-
ted by the UK’s Leverhulme 
Trust and the Collegium of 
Lyon on Territorial Governance 
in Western Europe between 
Convergence and Capacity1. 
The empirical data is focused 
mainly on four ‘second order 
strong identity’regions: Anda-
lucía (Spain), Brittany (France), 
Wales (UK) and Wallonia (Bel-
gium). These regions share many 
characteristics. These hybrid 
regions are economically chal-
lenged yet have a distinctive and 
developed territorial capacity. 
They each have ingrained tradi-
tions of social-democratic party 
control. They are regions facing 
stark economic challenges and 
problems of economic adapta-
tion. They are traditionally pro-
European regions, or at least 
regions benefiting from subs-
tantial EU investment. They 
are regions with a strong sense 
of territorial identity. They have 
variable degrees of decentralised 
authority: as a minimum, each 
has a directly elected regional 
Assembly with powers ranging 
from a general competency 
to partial legislative authority. 
The four regions exist in states 
that cover the range of logical 
possibilities for comparison: a 
loose federal state (Belgium), a 
hybrid state with some federal 
characteristics (Spain), a predo-
minantly unitary state modified 
by forms of asymmetrical devo-
lution (United Kingdom) and 
a decentralised but still unitary 
state (France). The EU context 
provides the core similarity 
between these states, with three 
of the four participating in the 
euro and signed up to the Treaty 
on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the Economic 
and Monetary Union (TSCG). 
The research involves sustai-
ned empirical investigation of 
sub-national governments and 
governance communities in the 
four regions over an 18 month 
period from November 2012 to 
May 2014.
TERRITORIAL 
GOVERNANCE AND 
ECONOMIC CRISIS: 
CONVERGENCE AND 
DIVERGENCE
How did our regions face up to 
the combined pressures of eco-
nomic crisis and political decen-
tralisation2? Is the economic 
crisis recentralising previously 
decentralised functions, or is 
there no linkage between these 
two phenomena? Are conver-
gence and divergence best consi-
dered as part of agency driven 
processes of adaptation and as 
strategic choices exercised by 
actors in regional governments? 
These questions were investiga-
ted via a series of semi-structu-
red interviews with comparable 
panels of actors (of around 25 
interlocutors) in each of our 
four regions. Identical questions 
were asked of our interlocutors 
in each region3.
HAS ECONOMIC 
CRISIS PRODUCED A 
RECENTRALISATION OF 
PUBLIC FINANCES?
The most obvious effect of 
economic crisis has involved 
moves to strengthen central 
government control over regional 
and local government financial 
circuits. As central governments 
are now threatened with stiff 
fines if they do not respect 
the revised budget and debt 
criteria, enshrined in the Treaty 
on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance, they are less willing 
to tolerate ‘spendthrift’local and 
regional authorities. In some 
instances, in Spain notably, 
regions have attempted to 
hand back competencies to 
central government. In France 
and Spain, the proportion of 
local and regional government 
expenditure directly transferred 
by central government grants 
has been rising (usually with 
forms of hypothecation). 
Enhanced centralisation of 
local financial circuits could be 
observed in France, for example, 
mainly as the result of a major 
tax reform in 2010 that involved 
the abolition of the local 
collection and setting of business 
rates and its replacement by 
a more centralised formula-
based method of tax collection 
(Steckel, 2012). In Spain, 
though many competencies 
have been devolved or are shared 
with the central state, 80% of 
the autonomous communities’ 
financial resources are 
transferred by the central state 
(Harguindéguy, et al, 2014). 
Our investigation in Andalucía 
revealed a region under 
sustained financial pressure, 
suffering budgetary cuts from 
central government, a decreasing 
performance of regional taxes 
and a drying up of bank loans. 
Even more than in France and 
Spain, public finance remains a 
highly centralised policy field 
within the UK. The Welsh 
policy community demanded 
enhanced fiscal autonomy, but 
politicians were careful not to 
call into question the core block 
grant mechanism of financing 
devolution, based on the Barnett 
formula. Key actors involved see 
little prospect for significant 
change or reform, even in the 
event of Scottish independence. 4
The case of Belgium stands apart 
(de Visscher and Laborderie, 
2013). Once the sixth reform of 
the State has been fully imple-
mented (in theory in 2014), 
the Federal government budget 
will be limited to servicing the 
national debt and funding part 
of social security, with all other 
functions having been regio-
nalised. The Belgian case raises 
the issue of the relative lack of 
linkage between the post-2008 
economic crisis and changes to 
the institutional architecture of 
the state; the causes of ever dee-
pening decentralisation are lin-
ked to community competition, 
communitarisation and regiona-
lisation that have their roots in 
Belgium’s uneven history. The 
Belgian case demonstrated a 
high degree of polarisation on 
institutional questions between 
the main Flemish and franco-
phone communities. Retaining 
credibility as a good European 
player, however, incited the main 
actors to agree on key measures 
of budgetary retrenchment; 
controlling the public debt was 
experienced less as an intole-
rable constraint than as a gauge 
of managerial credibility.
HAS ECONOMIC CRISIS 
RECENTRALISED 
DECENTRALISATION?
Rather more general analysis 
of the impact of the economic 
crisis on the decentralised and 
devolved forms of government 
revealed contrasting findings 
in our regions. Wales and Wal-
lonia, in rather different ways, 
were tied up with endogenous 
programmes of state reform, 
and socio-economic issues of 
economic crisis were given less 
saliency than in either Anda-
lucía or Brittany. In the cases of 
Wales and Wallonia, surprisin-
gly little indication was provi-
ded in fieldwork of the impact 
of economic crisis on prospects 
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for devolved government. In 
Wales, at the time of empirical 
investigation (November 2012–
July 2013) the Welsh Govern-
ment had begun a process of 
streamlining public service pro-
vision, encouraging collabora-
tion between service providers 
and introducing timid perfor-
mance management measures. 
But local government spending 
on frontline services had been 
sheltered from the worst of the 
cuts and public service provi-
ders acknowledged that condi-
tions might deteriorate. Welsh 
political debates were tied up 
in constitutional futures: wha-
tever happened in the Scottish 
Independence referendum and 
its aftermath would have an 
impact on Wales. Likewise, the 
panel in Wallonia (interviewed 
in early 2014), though touched 
by economic crisis, was preoc-
cupied with implementing the 
sixth state reform programme 
and deeply anxious about the 
prospect of further institutional 
and political deadlock after the 
2014 federal elections.
The French and Spanish regions, 
on the other hand, were more 
fully engaged with enduring 
economic crisis and the effects 
of the economic downturn on 
the broader territorial model. 
In both regions, a general sense 
of pessimism was shared by 
representatives of all parties, 
employers’ organisations, asso-
ciations and trade unions. There 
was heightened consciousness of 
the crisis. In Brittany, there was 
a deep sense of pessimism about 
the future of the Breton model 
of intensive agriculture, inspired 
by the massive layoffs or plant 
closures in 2013 at food produ-
cers Doux, Tilly Sabco and Gad. 
In Andalucía, the atmosphere 
was also generally pessimistic; 
the crisis had highlighted the 
contradictions of the ‘state of 
autonomies’. When forced to 
choose, Andalucían elites pre-
ferred solidarity between regions 
(using the historical debt of 
Spain towards Andalucía as an 
argument for continuing trans-
fers) over differentiation and 
enhanced autonomy.
CONVERGING 
EUROPEANISATION? AN 
END OF THE EUROPE OF 
THE REGIONS?
Is what direction is the rela-
tionship between European 
integration and regional govern-
ments heading? Does the Euro-
pean Union still provide a struc-
ture of opportunities for a third 
tier of regional government? Or, 
on the contrary, does the field-
work suggest scepticism towards 
the ‘Europe of the Regions’? 
Europe is an important strand 
of regional governance. All 
the selected regions have been 
key beneficiaries of EU struc-
tural funds and the Common 
Agricultural Policy. All regions 
ought to be pro-European.
The field of European inte-
gration appears as one of clear 
differentiation between these 
traditionally pro-European 
regions. The principal cause of 
variation related, first, to whe-
ther or not a region is within 
the Eurozone and, second, to 
the degree of influence exer-
cised domestically in relation to 
monetary policy (a highly Euro-
peanised policy domain). Euro-
peanisation might be unders-
tood as an independent variable, 
in the sense of the definition 
given by Cole and Drake (2000), 
where the direction of change 
and causality runs clearly from 
the European Union (and its 
multiple institutions) to mem-
ber-states and regions. The Fis-
cal Compact Treaty (TSCG), 
agreed in December 2011 and 
signed in 2012 by 25 of the 27 
EU member states, strengthe-
ned the automatic penalties to 
be paid by states who are unable 
to control their debt, or to bring 
into line their budgets to zero 
deficits by 2015. The TSCG 
came after a significant fiscal 
and budgetary tightening in the 
form of the Six Pack and the 
Two Pack, allowing the Euro-
pean Commission, through the 
European Semester process, a 
much more intrusive oversight 
into national budgets (inclu-
ding commenting upon natio-
nal budgets before they have 
passed the parliamentary stage). 
The European Semester pro-
cess produces annual reports on 
the strengths and, more usually, 
structural weaknesses of all EU 
states (including those, such as 
the UK and the Czech Republic, 
not having signed the TSCG). 
The details of these reports fil-
ter down into fields such as the 
housing market, wage indexa-
tion, pension ages – the core of 
traditional economic soverei-
gnty. Numerous competencies 
dealt with by local and regional 
authorities are concerned; espe-
cially in those areas of infras-
tructure and investment such as 
road building, urban transport 
or education that required long-
term capital investment.
Interlocutors in our three euro-
zone states expressed varying 
degrees of engagement with the 
European project. In Brittany, 
interviewees stressed their fun-
damentally pro-European sen-
timent: Europe was part of the 
Breton ‘DNA’. One of the core 
novelties of the 2013 round of 
interviews related to disillusion 
with the European Union as an 
institution (though not with the 
European ideal). The ‘neo-libe-
ral’European model of the Bar-
roso Commission was contrasted 
unfavorably, in interviews, with 
the traditional Breton model 
of partnership, cooperation and 
support for public services. The 
sense of relative deprivation was 
aggravated by the EU Com-
mission placing obstacles in 
the way of direct aids from the 
French government. Andalucía 
is also traditionally a strongly 
pro-European region and a key 
beneficiary of EU structural 
funds and the CAP. Against a 
backdrop of diminishing enthu-
siasm for the European pro-
ject, fieldwork uncovered two 
types of response to the EU 
question. First, interviewees 
lamented diminishing resources 
from the EU. Second, the PP-
led government in Madrid was 
blamed for using the crisis as an 
argument to recentralise control 
over a number of policy sectors 
and tighten budgetary stee-
ring. Belgium offered another 
interesting case. Interviewees 
in Wallonia and Belgium ove-
rwhelmingly backed the Euro-
pean ideal: in the words of one 
interlocutor, Belgians were the 
‘last Europeans’, now that even 
neighbouring Netherlands and 
France had moved in a less pro-
European direction. One inter-
viewee believed Belgians to be 
naïve, however; the European 
semester process and the recom-
mendations made by Brussels 
to stop indexing salaries with 
inflation were met with conster-
nation by the Belgian govern-
ment. The commitment to zero 
deficit budgets by 2015 was 
proving extremely difficult for 
Belgium’s regions and commu-
nities, as well as its local autho-
rities; another interlocutor pre-
dicted damaging consequences 
for the level of infrastructural 
investment.
The exception is most obviously 
presented by Wales, part of the 
sterling zone. The UK’s position 
outside of the Eurozone and 
the TSCG effectively shelters 
Wales from enhanced Euro-
pean budgetary supervision. In 
contrast to Scotland, Wales has 
no immediate existential choices 
to make and does not have to 
consider whether it might have 
to join the EU as a new member 
state. Welsh Government rheto-
ric remains staunchly pro-Euro-
pean. The EU remains seen as a 
benevolent fund-provider; there 
were clear signs of internal ten-
sion with UK premier Cameron 
and the commitment to hold a 
referendum in 2017 on the UK’s 
future membership of the EU.
Even in the Belgian case, the 
fieldwork suggested dimi-
nishing enthusiasm for the 
Europe of the Regions. Against 
this general conclusion, some 
distinctions can be drawn, 
the most obvious of which is 
between: Spain and Belgium, 
whose regions were at the fore-
front of attempts at budgetary 
discipline, and Brittany and 
Wales, somewhat further remo-
ved. Membership of the euro-
zone certainly played itself out 
 This European treemap visualization shows hierarchies in which the rectangular screen space is divided into about 1000 European NUTS2 regions. Each region belongs to a country in the hierarchy. This colourful presentations accommodates thousands of statistical data items in a meaningfully organized display allowing patterns and exceptions to be spotted immediately. 
The size of the rectangle refers to «Total Population» while the colour attribute represents elderly population in Europe «age group 65+ in %». When the colour and size dimensions are correlated in some way with the tree structure, one can often easily see patterns that would be difficult to spot in other ways, such as if a certain colour is particularly relevant. We see that 
Germany has a high rate of eldery people while, for example, Poland has a younger representation. Dashboard Demonstrator: http://mitweb.itn.liu.se/GAV/dashboard/#story=data/nuts-regions-ageing-population-in-europe-2010.xml&layout=[map,treemap]
The RFIEA warmly thanks the National Center for Visual Analytics of the Linköpig University, Sweden, for allowing us to use this map.
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as one of the key differentiating 
variables between our regions. 
Beyond the UK exception, three 
positions were identified: one 
(Wallonia) of Europeanisation 
facilitating coordination across 
community divides and, in some 
sense, empowering regions to 
participate in budgetary ret-
renchment; a second (Anda-
lucía) whereby the sacrifices 
required to conform to budge-
tary adjustment as a result of the 
economic crisis were deeply felt 
(but Madrid was principally bla-
med), and a third, that of tradi-
tionally pro-European Brittany, 
feeling a sense of (temporary) 
betrayal. Overall, we conclude 
that the economic crisis is pro-
ducing tensions between the 
EU, central governments and 
second order strong identity 
regions.
THE FUTURES OF 
REGIONAL GOVERNANCE
The financial crisis has provided 
evidence of some recentraliza-
tion of decentralization, and the 
latest phase of EU integration 
has forced central governments 
in most instances to attempt to 
exercise a tighter supervision 
over local and regional govern-
ment expenditures. Europeani-
sation has produced a lessening 
of divergence in legal systems 
and in the provenance of much 
public policy. But domestic state 
structures, party systems and 
the political rules of the game 
still make sense nationally, lea-
ding writers such as Schmidt 
(2006) to diagnose a dangerous 
gap between (national) political 
competition and (European) 
policy formulation.
Over and above distinctive 
national institutional structures 
and territorial assymetries, our 
survey demonstrated a high 
level of convergence in relation 
to the futures of regional gover-
nance. Each of our 100 interlo-
cutors was asked to identify the 
three principal challenges faced 
by the region over the next five 
year period. This measure was 
intended to capture how our 
panels of comparable actors 
envisaged the future of their res-
pective regions. We conclude this 
article by observing the consi-
derable regularities in terms of 
future policy challenges for our 
sample of European regions:
UNEMPLOYMENT, AND 
ESPECIALLY YOUTH 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
(WALES, ANDALUCÍA, 
BRITTANY, BELGIUM).
The pressing state of unem-
ployment was recognised in 
each of the four regions as the 
toughest challenge. The levels 
of youth unemployment in 
particular were presented as a 
major challenge. The example 
of Brussels, a city with a strong 
immigrant population and a 
high level of social deprivation, 
was instructive in this res-
pect: the young unemployed of 
immigrant origin were prima-
rily affected by socio-economic 
issues, their interest overloo-
ked in the community based 
rivalry between Flemings and 
Walloons.
ECONOMIC 
RECONVERSION 
AND THE CAPACITY 
OF ESTABLISHED 
TERRITORIAL MODELS 
(WALES, ANDALUCÍA, 
BRITTANY, BELGIUM)
In each region, there was soul-
searching about the capacity of 
the existing territorial model 
to cope with economic crisis 
and the challenges of reconver-
sion. Members of our Breton 
panel described a peripheral 
region facing a huge crisis of 
reconversion. The traditional 
pillars of the Breton economy 
(agriculture, agro-alimentary) 
were crumbling and the model 
of social-economic ‘concerta-
tion’was failing. Rather similar 
narratives emerged in each of 
our regions.
Education and levels of basic 
skills was a common theme in 
Wales, and Andalucía, to some 
degree in francophone Belgium 
and Brittany also. In Wales and 
Andalucià, raising the general 
educational level was identified 
as a vital priority. The Brittany 
region and Brussels-Wallonia 
Federation, starting from a much 
higher base, acknowledged pro-
blems of unequal educational 
performance.
POLITICAL 
DECENTRALISATION; 
CHALLENGES AND 
OPPORTUNITIES
The saliency of forms of political 
devolution came after the first 
three socio-economic issues. In 
the case of Brittany, the per-
ceived crisis of 2013 was linked 
by many respondents with a 
case for more political decen-
tralisation and a thorough-
going regionalisation. In Anda-
lucía, the PSOE-IU led region 
was caught between resisting 
Madrid’s sustained drive at 
recentralisation in education 
and arguing in favour of sustai-
ned ‘solidarity’and continuing 
financial transfers from richer 
regions (such as Catalonia). In 
Wales, the future of devolution 
was a major preoccupation, but 
judgement was suspended while 
awaiting the outcome of the 
Scottish referendum. In Wal-
lonia, there was no appetite for 
future decentralisation, but rea-
lisation that a new push from 
the Flemings would probably 
take place after the May 2014 
elections.
PRESERVING PUBLIC 
SERVICES
These social-democratic regions 
all identified the preservation 
of public services (especially 
health and education) as core to 
preserving their own territorial 
model. Interviewees in the Spa-
nish region were proud of the 
‘Andalucian model’of welfare, 
based on fiscal transfers from 
richer regions to Andalucía 
in the name of solidarity (and 
on transfers within Andalucía 
from the more affluent cities 
to the PSOE-led small towns). 
The panel in Brittany, likewise, 
used economic crisis to argue in 
favour of central state aid (for-
thcoming in the Breton plan of 
December 2013). In the case 
of Wales, fiscal transfers via 
the Barnett formula were given 
more importance than fiscal 
autonomy; recognising Welsh 
public service needs (and rela-
tive deprivation) was amongst 
the top priorities. In Wallonia, 
finally, defending public services 
in the name of solidarity was 
given a high priority.
These core challenges were suf-
ficiently similar to support a 
conclusion based on ideational 
soft convergence. Certainly, the 
core challenges identified by 
regional decision-makers were 
not those, in general, that were 
readily amenable to regional 
influence. Our second order 
strong identity regions had 
limited control over core macro-
economic levers, and each deve-
loped different versions of a 
mode of territorial action based 
on influencing central govern-
ment and the EU, in a pattern of 
multi-level governance. Each of 
our regions had different mixes 
of territorial political capacity, 
and ways of exercising influence; 
other regions not included in 
the survey would not neces-
sary share these priorities. The 
most significant distinction was 
between the two regions caught 
up in a process of ongoing poli-
tical decentralisation (Wales and 
Wallonia) and the French and 
Spanish regions, which appea-
red more directly affected by the 
direction of economic crisis and 
whose territorial models strug-
gled to cope with change.
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In this brief article I want to 
pose a few questions about 
the possible effects of security 
politics on the construction of 
a European citizenship. First, 
I shall define “security” and 
“citizenship”, by referring both 
to the existing literature and to 
the social and political processes 
this literature analyzes. I shall 
then describe some of the legal 
and political measures adop-
ted by the EU in the name of 
“security”, principally, but not 
only, concerning migrants from 
third countries. These measures, 
combined with national and 
local legislations and rhetoric, 
I shall argue, tend to construct 
citizenship (at all levels: Euro-
pean, national, local) in exclusio-
nary terms, around “fear” rather 
than “solidarity”, using an “us vs 
them” logic. This construction 
is at odds with other ways to 
conceive citizenship at both the 
European and national levels: 
the Charter of fundamental 
rights, but also many national 
constitutions, by recognizing 
most rights independently of 
legal citizenship, de facto adopt 
and promote a “citizenship” 
which is in principle inclusive 
and based on what is called the 
European social model.
SECURITY
Since the early 1990s, a “ghost” 
is haunting most of Europe: 
security has become the focus 
of much public rhetoric and 
policies at the local, national 
and EU levels, and at the same 
time has become the object of a 
constantly growing specialized 
scientific literature. Yet, well 
before these years the question 
of security had been studied 
from the point of view of crimi-
nology, the sociology of deviance 
and social control, the sociology 
of law. Sociologists and crimino-
logists described and analyzed a 
shift in the political understan-
ding and management of crime 
and deviance in Western demo-
cracies which was being justified 
in the name of “security”. Such 
shift may be summarized as fol-
lows: 1) “causes” of crime and 
deviance, whether economic, 
social, cultural, or (even) psy-
chological came to be conside-
red of little, if any, importance, 
in designing crime prevention 
or “war on crime” policies. Nei-
ther the social and economic 
environment, nor the minds of 
would be criminals need there-
fore to be changed: rather, poli-
cies should aim to make it more 
difficult to commit an illegal act, 
and to “incapacitate” those who 
commit them; 2) the attention 
shifted from “criminals” to “vic-
tims”, especially potential ones, 
i.e., the good citizens who must 
be defended from crime. “Vic-
tims” get center stage in dealing 
with the criminal question (I 
explored the close relationship 
between “victim” and the neoli-
beral subject in Pitch, 2010; see 
also Brown, 2006 and Foessel, 
2010); 3) measures to deal with 
crime and deviance came to a) 
be based on risk evaluations and 
the profiling of potentially “dan-
gerous” populations, with the 
adoption of so-called situational 
prevention, i.e. measures geared 
to diminish the risk of being 
criminally victimized (CCTV, 
enclosure of public spaces, gated 
communities, “zero tolerance” 
local policies), and b) the mul-
tiplication of criminal offenses 
and the increase of penalties 
(the literature is enormous, 
see for example Cohen, 1985, 
O’Malley, 1992, Feeley, Simon, 
1994, Garland, 2001). In short, 
security, risk prevention and risk 
minimization became the new 
key words and “safety” and the 
“containment of dangerousness” 
replaced “justice” and “social 
reform” (Bailey, Shearing, 1996). 
This shift occurred first in the 
US, which has to this day the 
by far largest imprisoned popu-
lation of Western democracies. 
According to Simon (2003), the 
crisis of the Keynesian model 
which occurred in the US in the 
mid-sixties spurred the emer-
gence of a mode of government 
“through crime”, that is to say 
a government which used the 
“fear of crime” and the need for 
more “security” to legitimize 
itself and promote a “fight of 
crime model” of government in 
all relevant institutions. Others 
(Wacquant, 2009; De Giorgi, 
2000) have spoken of the subs-
titution of the social state by a 
penal state, and described the 
importation of this model in 
Europe during the 80s and 90s. 
The rise of the “security impe-
rative” in public discourse and 
policy initiatives in most of the 
West has been documented and 
discussed widely not only by 
criminologists and sociologists 
of deviance and social control, 
but also by general sociologists, 
philosophers and political scien-
tists (see, among others, Bau-
man 1999, Offe, 1999).
“Security”, in this literature, 
mainly means “protection from 
risks of criminal victimization”. 
In public and political discourse 
it is then possible to detect a 
significant shift in the meaning 
of security, as in the so-called 
Golden thirty years (1945-
1975) security was used preva-
lently to signify social security, 
i.e. the protection from the risks 
of life (illness, unemployment, 
disability, poverty), to be provi-
ded to all citizens through pro-
portional taxation (solidarity).
It appears, then, that in the past 
40 years or so, the meaning of 
security in public discourse has 
reverted to its Hobbesian ori-
gins: protection of one’s life, 
freedom from threats coming 
from other citizens (but for 
a more nuanced reading of 
Hobbes, see Foessel, 2010).
SECURITY POLITICS AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE EU
Tamar Pitch | résidente à l’IEA de Nantes
Tamar Pitch est professeur à la faculté de droit de l ’université de Pérouse. Diplômée de l ’université de Florence et de l ’université du Connecticut, elle a été lauréate 
d’une bourse Fulbright et d’une bourse de la Fondation Wolfson. Ses livres, articles et recherches portent sur le crime et la justice pénale, la déviance et le contrôle 
social, le droit et la problématique du genre, les droits de l ’homme, les questions d’égalité et de discrimination.
14
perspectives n. 12 — hiver | winter 2014-2015
Indeed, in the European theo-
retical and philosophical tradi-
tion, security and citizenship are 
notions which imply each other. 
Hobbes posed internal and 
external security as the justifica-
tion of the creation of the State 
by individuals who then become 
“citizens”: internal security 
meant the monopolization of 
legitimate violence by the state 
to protect citizens from threats 
coming from other citizens; 
external protection meant the 
defense and inviolability of state 
borders. State, territory, nation: 
the extension of sovereign power 
to a territory produced together 
the nation and the “people”. 
Security here means not only 
protection of individual citizens 
but also protection of a political 
community in a given territory 
from threats coming from the 
outside.
The two types of security were 
to be managed by different 
agencies: internal security was 
(mainly) the task of the police, 
external security was (mainly) 
the task of the army. Thus cri-
minals and enemies were clearly 
separated. These two types of 
security were also the object of 
study of different disciplines: 
criminologists and sociologists 
studied the first, international 
affairs scholars, security experts 
and security agencies studied 
the second.
The end of the Cold War 
marked a significant change for 
the study and management of 
external security. External secu-
rity itself came to be defined and 
constructed in a different way, 
as territorial borders increasin-
gly became porous and states’ 
sovereignty weakened through 
what is commonly called globa-
lization. International terrorism 
and transnational organized 
crime contributed to the blur-
ring of the distinction between 
criminals and enemies (I dis-
cussed this blurring in Pitch, 
2010). As Bigo (2005) notes, 
security agencies started mer-
ging questions of policing and 
of defense. He also contends 
that this development was tied 
in with a discursive shift from 
threats of identifiable enemies 
to notions of risks, thus (I add) 
paralleling the similar discursive 
shift which occurred in crimi-
nology (see on this Cohen 1985, 
Garland, 2001).
But within security studies a 
new, critical and anti-realis-
tic, approach emerged in the 
90s, whereby “security” came 
to be considered a “speech 
act” by which policy questions 
are transformed into existen-
tial issues (Buzan, Waever, 
de Wilde, 1998). Within this 
approach, questions of security 
are seen not as something given, 
but as something constructed by 
political elites, which in this way 
transfer issues from normal, and 
democratic, political debate to 
an emergency register where it is 
the executive that is empowered 
to take the necessary decisions.
Critical security studies and 
critical criminology and socio-
logy thus converge in the view 
that contemporary security 
issues have become dominant 
in political discourse and policy 
decisions not because threats 
have multiplied and become 
more serious, but on account of 
social, economic, political and 
policy changes which may be 
summarized in the emergence 
and hegemony of a neoliberal 
political rationality and mode 
of government (among many 
others, see Brown, 2006, Dar-
dot, Laval 2009). To summarize 
a complex series of arguments: 
socialized risks have been indi-
vidualized and privatized, the 
responsibility for taking and 
avoiding them shifted from 
the State to the individual, the 
uncertainty and insecurity deri-
ving from increased unemploy-
ment, precarious jobs and the 
erosion of welfare provisions 
has been deflected against “cri-
minals”, terrorists, migrants and 
asylum seekers…
CITIZENSHIP
Security and citizenship are 
connected, as I said, both from 
a philosophical point of view 
(Hobbes), and a sociological 
and empirical one. Citizenship 
is a legal status, signifying mem-
bership in a political community 
(see Costa, 2005), from which 
a number of rights and duties 
derive. In the second half of 
the last century, citizenship has 
come to mean that status which 
implies the entitlement to and 
actual enjoyment of civil, politi-
cal and social rights (Marshall, 
1950). In principle exclusionary 
(as that status which separates 
citizens from non citizens), 
citizenship in the Marshall 
sense of the term has an inclu-
sive and expansionist meaning. 
Indeed, as I said, the long and 
rigid post Second World War 
constitutions of much continen-
tal Europe, recognizing a num-
ber of fundamental rights to 
persons, rather than to citizens, 
implicitly adopt and construct 
an inclusive and enlarged type 
of citizenship. The same may be 
said of the various international 
human rights declarations, pacts, 
and agreements, the European 
Charter of fundamental rights 
included.
Thus, security in its social sense 
and citizenship in its (more) 
inclusive sense appear to stand 
(and, perhaps, perish) together.
SECURITY POLITICS IN 
THE EU
While it was mainly crimino-
logists and sociologists who 
studied the rise of the “fear of 
crime” model of government at 
the national and local levels (the 
literature is enormous, but to 
cite just a few, see: Body Gen-
drot 2000, Crawford 1998, Gau-
tron 2006, Robert 1999, Cas-
tel 2003, Pavarini 2006, Pitch 
2000 and 2001, Simon, 2003), 
the EU politics of security have 
been prevalently studied wit-
hin the new critical security 
studies approach I mentioned. 
That is perhaps why there is as 
yet no comprehensive analysis 
that embraces all three levels 
of government, while it may be 
supposed that they are closely 
connected.
The EU politics of security 
have been mainly studied in 
the context of immigration 
and asylum seeking from third 
countries, but, as we shall see, 
they actually concern also EU 
citizens.
What it is called the “securiti-
zation” of immigration within 
EU politics precedes both the 
end of the Cold War and 9/11. 
As Huysmans says (2006), “In 
the European integration pro-
cess an internal security field 
that connects issues of border 
control, terrorism, drugs, orga-
nized crime and asylum seeking 
was developed since the mid80s 
and gained extra momentum in 
the 1990s” (p. 1). It may seem 
a paradox that security mea-
sures and security rhetorics 
became very relevant in the 
EU at the time when a “terri-
torialized enemy” (Bigo, 2006) 
had disappeared and a space of 
freedom of movement for EU 
citizens (and the virtual disap-
pearance of national borders) 
was being instituted through the 
Schengen agreements (1985). 
On the one hand, especially for 
those scholars who focus on the 
workings of security agencies 
(see, for example, Bigo, 2005, 
2006) this securitization pro-
cess may be attributed, at least 
in part, precisely to the bureau-
crats and security experts’ need 
to re-orient and redefine their 
role in a changed context. On 
the other hand, this process may 
be seen as consistent with and 
functional to a neoliberal politi-
cal rationality, whereby security 
in the EU “is directly related 
to the promotion of mobility 
and circulation of populations, 
goods and services” (van Muns-
ter, 2009, p. 98). Rather than 
being in contradiction, then, 
more freedom of movement 
for EU citizens, and increased 
restrictions for third country 
citizens respond to a “liberal 
notion of security”, according 
to which social control is better 
achieved through administra-
tive measures and regulations 
than by outright legal prohibi-
tions. Indeed, as van Munster 
shows, while the mobility of EU 
citizens is promoted, the mobi-
lity of migrants “by effect of 
their risk class membership, is 
channeled through technologies 
of security which seek to ren-
der them increasingly immobile 
through preventing them from 
moving or, in case they move, by 
restricting and channeling their 
movement through technolo-
gies of risk management” (p. 98; 
the parallel with what has hap-
pened at the local and national 
levels is striking: see Lianos, 
Douglas, 2000). Risk and risk 
management, via the construc-
tion of potentially “dangerous 
populations”, then, are at the 
core of EU security politics just 
as they are at the core of those 
national and local criminal jus-
tice changes criminologists and 
sociologists have been pointing 
at in the last 30 years.
The Schengen agreements at 
one and the same time made it 
easier for EU nationals to move 
through Europe and much 
more difficult for third country 
nationals to enter into and move 
through this space. In 1990 
the Convention Applying the 
Schengen agreements directly 
connected immigration with 
terrorism and transnational 
crime, placing the regulation of 
immigration in an institutional 
framework that dealt with the 
protection of internal security. 
Indeed, while Schengen 1 was 
negotiated between and draf-
ted by transport and foreign 
affairs officials, Schengen 2 was 
drafted by internal security pro-
fessionals. In the 1985 agree-
ments, security was not central, 
though it already provided a link 
between free movement and 
security concerns. After 9/11 the 
transfer of the security connota-
tions of terrorism to the area of 
migration became explicit (cf.. 
Arts. 16 and 17 of the European 
Council Common Position on 
Combating Terrorism, Decem-
ber 2001). Migrants and asylum 
seekers shifted from being fra-
med as a humanitarian or eco-
nomic issue to being framed as 
a security issue, thus paralleling 
an analogous shift occurring at 
the national and local levels.
Though arguably migrants and 
asylum seekers constitute the 
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main population targeted by EU 
security politics, they are not the 
only one. The Schengen agree-
ments and subsequent policy 
documents contemplate res-
trictions legitimated by security 
concerns also for EU nationals. 
Such restrictions may be applied 
by States when they think their 
security is threatened. How 
and why states decide to apply 
them is not being monitored, 
so these decisions are discretio-
nary. Potential “troublemakers” 
may be stopped from crossing 
borders, and what constitutes 
“troublemaking” is an evalua-
tion left to each country on the 
basis of “suspicion” and risk cal-
culations, thus outside of any 
clear legal standards. A Security 
Handbook for the use of police 
at international events has also 
been created, on the same prin-
ciples, and permanent “risk 
analysis” must be carried out by 
each national agency involved. 
The EU Council Recommen-
dation of April 22 1996 calls 
for an overall assessment of 
the potential for disorder and 
the standardization of intelli-
gence about suspected groups 
of troublemakers. Another EU 
Council Recommendation 
advocates the collection, analy-
sis and exchange of information 
on all sizeable groups that may 
pose a threat to law, order and 
security when travelling to ano-
ther member state to participate 
in a meeting attended by large 
numbers of persons from more 
than one Member State (1997) 
(Apap, Carrera, 2004). Policies 
developed to fight terrorism 
and illegal immigration are thus 
applied to EU citizens as well, 
by labeling them “unwanted”, 
“unwelcome”, “suspect”. What 
is being restricted in this case 
is not only freedom of move-
ment, but also other fundamen-
tal rights, such as the freedom 
of expression, since people are 
classified “suspect” on the basis 
of their political ideas and 
the assumption that they will 
want to express them. Thus, 
approaches, languages and tech-
niques developed in the name of 
security against terrorism, orga-
nized crime and illegal immi-
gration spill over and curtail 
fundamental rights of, also, EU 
citizens.
But there is another “at risk” 
population of EU nationals 
whose citizenship rights may 
be curtailed in the name of 
security. It is that composed of 
so-called “football hooligans”. 
No definition of hooliganism 
has been provided by policies: 
“hooligans’” stigmatization, 
according to Tsoukala (2009) is 
accompanied by what she calls 
“a splintered definitional process 
that mirrors the evolving natio-
nal and international security 
stakes” (p. 6), so that we can 
observe significant interactions 
between the security field as a 
whole and the counter-hooliga-
nism policies at the European, 
state, and local levels (I have 
discussed the Italian case in 
Pitch, 2013). Since the tragedy 
at the Heysel stadium in 1985, 
situational prevention measures, 
centered on the segregation and 
surveillance of football specta-
tors, has extended in terms of 
time (before and after games), 
space (places outside the foot-
ball stadium) and targeted 
populations (potential trouble-
makers). Increased punishments 
and repressive administration 
measures (preventive detention 
included) are disposed for acts 
which would not be conside-
red a crime or a threat outside a 
sporting event (Tsoukala, 2009). 
National and international foot-
ball bans are imposed. The EU 
council recommendations I 
cited above apply to football and 
other sports’ spectators as well 
as potential protesters. Indeed, 
the EU Council (2001) expli-
citly puts football hooliganism 
and political demonstrations 
together as “threats to urban 
security”.
THE RISK OF SECURITY 
POLITICS
The criminological and socio-
logical literature studying secu-
rity politics and policies at the 
national and local levels, and the 
security studies analyzing these 
politics and policies at the EU 
level converge on the interpreta-
tion of their consequences. Not 
only they appear to be ineffec-
tive in reassuring the supposedly 
fearful population they purport 
to protect: they actually tend to 
escalate, by reproducing insecu-
rity through “emergency” dis-
courses which often use the lan-
guage of war (on drugs, illegal 
immigration, terrorism, orga-
nized crime) and promising an 
impossible total security (Castel, 
2003). The discursive register of 
security dictates the solution 
to the issues it is applied to: in 
other words, it is the solution 
which constructs the problem, 
as the case of immigration 
shows. Here we may note a very 
good example of a self-fulfilling 
prophecy: the shift of immigra-
tion from being seen as a huma-
nitarian and economic problem 
to a security issue implies more 
restrictive immigration poli-
cies which on their turn push 
migrants towards illegality, plus 
reinforcing EU nationals’ diffi-
dence towards them.
The impact of these policies 
(and of the discourses justifying 
them) on the construction and 
interpretation of citizenship is 
twofold. On the one hand, they 
make it more difficult to become 
a EU national for migrants from 
third countries and on the other 
they restrict the very meaning 
of citizenship, by dividing the 
“good” citizens from the “bad” 
and curtailing the enjoyment of 
fundamental rights these last are 
entitled to on very fragile bases, 
i.e., suspicion and risk. These 
policies and accompanying dis-
courses legitimize an “us” ver-
sus “them” political and cultu-
ral climate and a citizenship 
constructed through and by fear. 
As I said, citizenship is a status 
which is always in some measure 
exclusionary. But if we confront 
the way in which citizenship is 
constructed through security 
politics and discourses and the 
way it is conceived in the Euro-
pean Charter of fundamental 
rights (18-12-2000), we see two 
very different models. In the 
Charter, civil and social rights 
are due to persons, not citizens, 
and civil and social rights are 
posed as indivisible. This means 
that the Charter disposes that 
at the heart of the European 
project should lie the Euro-
pean social model, but, even 
more importantly for what I am 
trying to say here, it says that an 
European “people”, or political 
community, should be an effect, 
rather than a pre-requisite of a 
European constitution. In the 
charter, then, a European poli-
tical community is not supposed 
to be already existing and just 
in need of protection to pres-
erve its integrity and “purity”. 
Politics and rhetoric of security, 
on the other hand, produce and 
support a vision of an already 
given and culturally homoge-
neous political community, 
to be defended from internal 
and especially external threats 
(as Feeley and Simon, 1994, 
say about local communities: 
“communities… construct their 
boundaries around concerns 
and anxieties about crime… 
’defensive exclusivity’ can 
become a powerful dynamic in 
the formation and sustenance of 
communal existence, such that 
communities may increasingly 
come together less for what 
they share in common and more 
for what they fear”, p. 260). 
Migrants are indeed construc-
ted as a security threat not only 
because they are seen as poten-
tial criminals and terrorists, but 
also because they are supposed 
to contaminate a (fictitious) 
common cultural identity. The 
two citizenship models are in 
sharp contrast: and on the eve 
of difficult European elections, 
where many predict a sharp rise 
in xenophobic and nationalist 
votes, the inclusive one is at 
great risk.
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
SECURITY POLITICS AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE EU
The end of the Cold War marked a significant change for the study and 
management of external security. External security itself came to be 
defined and constructed in a different way, as territorial borders increa-
singly became porous and states’ sovereignty weakened through what is 
commonly called globalization. International terrorism and transnational 
organized crime contributed to the blurring of the distinction between 
criminals and enemies.
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« Il n’existe pas de genre littéraire 
qui ait conquis le monde autant 
que le roman », écrivait en 1921 
Aristotélis Kourtidis, savant 
réputé, pédagogue et homme 
de lettres, dans la publication 
du texte de la conférence qu’il 
avait prononcée à la Société 
Littéraire « Parnassos » quatre 
années auparavant, en 1917, sur 
« Alexandre Rizos-Rangavis 
auteur de récits ». La supréma-
tie désormais indubitable du 
genre romanesque en Europe 
ainsi que les tentatives dans 
cette direction des auteurs grecs, 
qui annonçaient l’expansion 
croissante du genre aussi dans 
l’espace hellénique, imposaient, 
selon Kourtidis, qu’on rétablît la 
civilisation grecque à la hauteur 
de la civilisation européenne par 
l’intégration du genre roma-
nesque dans la tradition litté-
raire grecque, par le rappel de sa 
relation étroite avec l’hellénisme 
et, naturellement, de sa généa-
logie remontant à l’antiquité. 
Kourtidis fait donc plonger 
les racines du roman européen 
moderne dans le roman de l’an-
tiquité tardive pour des raisons 
de prestige national. Les raisons 
avancées par Kourtidis afin de 
justifier la pertinence de l’iden-
tification généalogique d’un 
genre qui avait déjà submergé le 
paysage littéraire international 
sont celles de la nécessité et 
de la survie nationale, dans la 
mesure où cette relation généa-
logique directe devait contri-
buer au combat de la nation 
« pour l’existence », lequel se 
livrait jusque sur les « frontières 
intellectuelles ».
N’oublions d’ailleurs pas que la 
conférence sur Rangavis a été 
prononcée durant la Première 
Guerre mondiale, et que sa 
publication a eu lieu au cours 
d’une période de troubles et 
de revendications territoriales, 
précédant de peu la catastrophe 
d’Asie Mineure. La revendica-
tion de l’origine grecque antique 
du roman européen est donc 
imposée, selon Kourtidis, par la 
nécessité de renforcer l’identité 
nationale et culturelle. L’idée 
de la continuité de la nation 
grecque depuis l’antiquité 
constituait d’ailleurs la doc-
trine majeure destinée à étayer 
l’identité néo-hellénique : elle 
avait joué un rôle déterminant 
depuis l’époque de Coray et tout 
au long du xixe siècle, trouvant 
à s’appliquer dans toutes les 
manifestations de la vie intel-
lectuelle. Parallèlement, dans 
le champ des études littéraires, 
l’approche généalogique (onto-
logique) des genres reflète tout 
autant les tendances de la cri-
tique littéraire du xixe siècle – 
qui considère les genres comme 
des organismes vivants soumis 
au développement et à l’évolu-
tion – que la conception histo-
riographique sur l’évolution de 
type généalogique des nations 
et sur leurs particularités carac-
térielles ; Kourtidis réactive 
ainsi l’idée de la « continuité », 
de la permanence de la Grèce, 
qui a principalement marqué le 
xixe siècle, et tente d’intégrer 
le roman dans une lignée inin-
terrompue allant de l’antiquité 
hellénique à l’Europe des temps 
modernes, renforçant ainsi la 
fierté nationale à travers la dis-
tinction culturelle de la Grèce 
dans l’espace européen.
Relier le roman antique au 
roman moderne n’était cepen-
dant pas une idée neuve, ni même 
une idée exclusivement grecque. 
En effet, le développement pro-
gressif du roman au xixe siècle 
avait déjà conduit les études 
littéraires en Europe à confron-
ter ces deux expressions de la 
fiction narrative. Cependant , 
le traitement de cette rela-
tion dans un esprit national, 
dans une perspective généalo-
gique et évolutionnaire, avait 
débuté chez Coray, puis avait 
trouvé des continuateurs chez 
d’autres érudits pendant les der-
nières décennies du xixe siècle 
et finalement chez Kourtidis 
au début du xxe. Par consé-
quent, chronologiquement , c’est 
Adamance Coray qui précède, 
par cette fameuse lettre adres-
sée à Alexandros Vassiliou qui 
constitue les « Prolégomènes » 
à l’édition des Éthiopiques 
d’Héliodore (1804), incluse 
dans l’édition posthume de la 
collection des Prolégomènes 
aux auteurs grecs de l’antiquité 
(1833). C’est ensuite Constan-
tin I. Dragoumis, auteur d’une 
Histoire de la création roma-
nesque chez les Grecs de l ’antiquité 
(1865-66) et Tryphon Évangéli-
dis avec La création romanesque 
chez les Grecs de l ’antiquité 
étendue jusqu’à nos jours (1899, 
1910). Kourtidis lui-même avait 
déjà publié une brève étude sur 
Héliodore en 1908-1909. Les 
érudits qui s’attachèrent au 
cours du xixe siècle à l’étude du 
roman grec antique comparé au 
roman moderne européen mais 
aussi grec, à l’exception bien sûr 
de Coray, étaient donc des intel-
lectuels d’importance mineure. 
Ils n’étaient pas ceux dont le 
discours et la pensée laissèrent 
leur empreinte à l’avant-garde 
intellectuelle, mais ceux qui, 
appuyés sur la tradition, vou-
lurent renforcer le sentiment 
et la fierté de la nation. Entre 
parenthèses, on pourrait noter 
que par analogie avec ce qui se 
passait en Europe, en Grèce 
pendant le dernier quart du 
xixe siècle a émergé une couche 
d’érudits qui a agi au sein de 
la sphère publique en rela-
tion surtout avec la presse ainsi 
qu’avec l’éducation scolaire et 
s’est adressée au grand public 
de diverses manières. Il ne s’agit 
point d’une élite d’intellec-
tuels mais d’une sous-catégo-
rie qui, de conscience plutôt de 
pédagogue que d’intellectuel, a 
approché la société grecque de 
l’intérieur et non pas d’en haut, 
avec ses propres normes et prin-
cipes et avec sa propre langue et 
morale. Le statut professionnel 
de pédagogue ou l’intervention 
plus générale de ces érudits aux 
institutions de l’éducation ren-
force l’importance de leur pré-
sence dans la sphère publique, 
puisque, d’après leur rôle et 
en tant qu’auteurs de manuels 
scolaires, conversent avec le 
discours officiel de l’État et 
deviennent ses agents dans la 
société. Il s’agit de l’expression 
particulière d’une tendance plus 
générale vers la formation des 
Grecs qui met l’accent sur des 
questions d’éducation nationale, 
sociale et morale et s’est mani-
festée à travers les orientations 
idéologiques et la thématique de 
la littérature, son interconnexion 
avec des tendances analogues 
en ethnologie et en histoire, le 
développement de la littérature 
enfantine, la création d’autant 
plus contrôlée par l’État des 
manuels scolaires, la fondation 
des associations culturelles, la 
croissance des maisons d’édition, 
la publication de journaux et de 
revues, etc.
Dans ce contexte, si pour Kour-
tidis l’origine grecque antique 
du roman constituait l’adop-
tion fière d’une réussite intel-
lectuelle majeure, pour les éru-
dits précédents cette filiation 
antique ne fonctionnait pas en 
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mêmes termes de revendica-
tion de fierté, mais bien en ceux 
d’une sauvegarde du prestige 
des ancêtres face à un genre qui, 
dans sa version moderne, était 
généralement discrédité. Le 
roman, du début jusqu’à la fin 
du xixe siècle, n’était pas encore 
un genre admis par le monde 
des érudits grecs, à cause de 
ses relations avec l’imaginaire 
aux dépens de la représentation 
de la réalité. Ainsi, d’une part 
il provoquait de violentes que-
relles littéraires et, de l’autre, son 
aura européenne constituait une 
menace pour l’hellénocentrisme 
et l’éducation morale des Grecs 
modernes. L’enveloppe idéolo-
gique de cette corrélation entre 
roman ancien et moderne est 
donc à chaque fois constituée de 
composantes différentes selon 
l’époque et le degré de déve-
loppement et de réception du 
genre romanesque en Grèce et 
en Europe.
Les termes déjà utilisés par les 
Européens dans leurs études 
littéraires portant sur le roman 
grec antique (roman, romanzo, 
novel) permettaient d’ailleurs 
l’approche commune du roman 
grec antique et du roman euro-
péen moderne, de façon ana-
chronique et fortement arbi-
traire d’ailleurs, puisqu’on avait 
toujours su que les anciens 
n’avaient pas inventé de terme 
particulier pour ce genre. Les 
textes compris sous cette déno-
mination (anciens et modernes) 
constituaient ainsi des échantil-
lons d’un seul et même genre, 
en dépit du fait que le roman 
grec de l’antiquité, ainsi que ses 
divers avatars médiévaux, pré-
sentaient une structure parfaite-
ment définie et constante alliée 
à une visée morale précise se 
rapprochant fort peu du roman 
psychologique ou du roman réa-
liste polyphonique aux multiples 
niveaux narratifs du xixe siècle 
répondant au modèle des 
œuvres de Balzac, de Zola et des 
romanciers russes.
RÉALITÉ ET IMAGINATION
Étant donné que le rapport de 
la prose au réel était la condition 
idéologique et esthétique exigée 
à l’époque, la question qui sur-
git porte sur le mode de choix 
qui régit la perception du roman 
grec antique par les érudits 
grecs au cours du xixe siècle 
mais aussi au début du xxe. Les 
études européennes, auxquelles 
ils se référaient par excellence, 
avaient déjà clairement souligné 
la prédominance de l’imaginaire 
dans le roman grec antique, 
composante qu’ils considéraient 
d’ailleurs avec dédain.
Alexis Chassang, pour lequel il 
allait de soi que la vérité histo-
rique du contenu mais aussi la 
vraisemblance de la narration 
devaient constituer des cri-
tères essentiels d’évaluation des 
romans antiques, avait naturel-
lement souligné la prévalence 
de l’imaginaire dans le roman 
grec antique dans lequel, entre 
autres, il relevait principalement 
les interventions divines dans le 
cours de l’intrigue. Il considère 
également que la description des 
sociétés ne correspond pas à la 
réalité historique, que les inci-
dents de la vie quotidienne sont 
improbables et irréalistes, tan-
dis que l’analyse des sentiments 
est superficielle et se limite à la 
description des circonstances 
intimes qui les font naître. 
Fréquemment, il met l’accent 
sur des incompatibilités et des 
ruptures concernant le contenu 
impudique et érotique qui vient 
s’opposer à la pureté exception-
nelle et à la morale des héros. À 
l’occasion des romans d’Hélio-
dore, il note que l’absence de 
toute vraisemblance constitue 
la caractéristique commune de 
tous les romans grecs antérieurs 
et postérieurs à cette période 
et fait de cette absence la règle 
générale de la production 
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romanesque qui se développe 
à l’époque dans la littérature 
grecque. Le fait que Coray, dans 
son effort pour accentuer l’ori-
gine classique du roman de la 
basse antiquité, avait souligné 
les nombreuses dettes d’Hélio-
dore envers la poésie épique 
mène Chassang à le critiquer 
avec l’argument que les modèles 
du prosateur ne doivent pas être 
recherchés dans le discours poé-
tique ; la prose poétique d’Hé-
liodore, selon Chassang, consti-
tue un « genre faux ».
Erwin Rohde, de son côté, afin 
de prouver que le roman grec 
antique ne constituait pas le 
produit du tempérament enclin 
à l’imagination des peuples de 
l’Orient, ainsi que l’avait sou-
tenu Huet, mais qu’il constituait 
l’évolution naturelle de la tradi-
tion grecque, devait interpréter 
la présence marquée et la fonc-
tion particulière de l’imaginaire 
dans le roman. Selon Rohde, la 
thématique de l’amour prove-
nait de la poésie érotique tandis 
que les voyages prodigieux à des 
lieux inconnus et imaginaires 
prenaient leurs sources dans la 
littérature de voyages imagi-
naires et la description des lieux 
utopiques. La description vrai-
semblable et réaliste de l’Atlan-
tide dans la République de Pla-
ton, de Coucouville-les-Nuées 
dans les Oiseaux d’Aristophane 
et les descriptions des lieux ima-
ginaires par Éphémère de Mes-
sine sont tous des textes anté-
rieurs à la conquête romaine. 
Ils constituent des preuves 
d’une tradition qui admettait 
l’imaginaire dans le but de cri-
tiquer la situation de l’époque 
et de rechercher des issues à la 
réalité. L’outil indispensable à 
la représentation littéraire du 
contenu imaginaire au cours de 
la basse antiquité a été fourni 
par la seconde sophistique qui a 
souvent cultivé la rhétorique au 
détriment de la profondeur et de 
la vérité des propos. Finalement, 
le roman grec antique s’est avéré 
une échappatoire à la réalité à 
travers l’art du discours, la nar-
ration fictionnelle.
Les théories de Rohde ont été 
de nos jours en partie réfutées, 
les objections portant principa-
lement sur sa façon de joindre 
poésie amoureuse élégiaque et 
narration de voyages imagi-
naires et touchant par consé-
quent la mesure selon laquelle 
le roman grec antique consti-
tue véritablement la continuité 
d’une tradition précédente. 
Cependant, la préférence du 
roman grec antique pour l’ima-
gination demeure un fait. Yior-
gis Yatromanolakis note à ce 
sujet : « Le roman grec antique 
né […] à une époque où la 
mimésis du monde constituait 
le jeu littéraire suprême, et où la 
technê avait le pas sur la physis, le 
genre ne pouvait manifester de 
préférence exclusive envers l’élé-
ment réaliste. Le prodigieux et 
le magique était ce qu’il recher-
chait, puisque c’était ce qu’exi-
geait son créateur et « écrivain » 
primordial, à savoir son lecteur 
quotidien ».
Le roman grec antique était 
en vérité un « romantzo », une 
histoire sentimentale, une aven-
ture prodigieuse de déplace-
ments. Par rapport au roman 
du xixe siècle, il est régi par une 
logique totalement différente à 
l’intérieur de laquelle le rôle du 
divin et du Destin est crucial. Il 
a d’autres objectifs qu’il atteint 
sans disséquer la réalité sociale 
de son époque, mais qui conduit 
à une autre réalité, une réalité 
idéale, dans un cadre spatio-
temporel délibérément imprécis. 
Par conséquent, il serait sans 
objet de rechercher en lui une 
analyse de caractères semblable 
à celle du roman réaliste ou psy-
chologique du xixe siècle, ou 
bien encore une perception et 
une représentation de la réalité 
analogues.
D’ailleurs Émile Zola, que Kour-
tidis loue particulièrement dans 
son étude sur Rangavis, et qu’il 
mentionne à part parmi les ins-
pirateurs de modèles du roman 
contemporain, s’était exprimé 
de manière dédaigneuse au sujet 
du roman grec antique, exacte-
ment parce qu’il n’avait que fort 
peu de relation avec la représen-
tation fidèle de la réalité : « La 
fiction y règne en souveraine ; 
ce ne sont que mensonges, que 
faits merveilleux, qu’intrigues 
embrouillées et incroyables. Les 
conteurs n’y ont presque jamais 
mis un détail juste et observé, 
les mille petits incidents de la 
vie intime y font défaut ; et ces 
œuvres, qui devraient peindre 
la société telle qu’elle était 
alors, nous emportent dans 
un monde fabuleux, au milieu 
d’aventures mensongères et de 
personnages extravagants. On 
sent que le roman n’a jamais 
été pour les Grecs une peinture 
de la vie réelle, encadrée dans 
une action vraisemblable ; il 
a été uniquement pour eux 
un poème vulgaire, un conte 
merveilleux qui charmait 
leur vive imagination, un 
entassement de fables d’autant 
plus attrayantes qu’elles étaient 
plus compliquées, un ragoût 
largement épicé de luxure qui 
réveillait le palais blasé des 
lecteurs de la décadence ».
Dans l’espace grec, c’est Coray 
qui avait déjà tracé la voie à 
la perception du roman grec 
antique, fondé sur l’œuvre de 
l’évêque d’Avranches, Pierre-
Daniel Huet, Traité de l ’ori-
gine des romans (1670). D’ail-
leurs, quand il avait nommé le 
roman grec antique en tant que 
« mythistoria », il l’avait défini 
en tant que « histoire fausse, 
mais probable, d’épreuves et 
déboires amoureux, savamment 
écrite de manière dramatique, 
principalement en prose », 
suivant en cela Aristote 
pour lequel les hommes ne 
peuvent trouver plaisir qu’à 
des histoires convaincantes ou 
bien déjà connue d’eux, et non 
à des créations sans fondement 
logique nées de l’imagination. 
De cette façon, Coray, non seu-
lement il oriente l’intérêt des 
Grecs vers l’antiquité, mais il 
s’oppose aussi indirectement au 
roman européen à l’imagination 
marquée.
Aussi bien Dragoumis qu’Évan-
gélidis contournent avec 
quelque embarras la question 
de l’imaginaire par d’impor-
tantes questions de structure, de 
contenu, mais aussi d’idéologie, 
posées par les romans antiques. 
Par ailleurs, ils insistent sur 
leur caractère haut en couleurs, 
leur dimension informative et 
leur valeur historique. Il est 
évident que Kourtidis a puisé 
dans l’ouvrage de Rohde aussi 
bien que dans celui de Coray 
afin d’affirmer l’origine grecque 
du roman moderne, mais qu’il 
a à son tour passé sous silence 
toute remarque sur le substrat 
imaginaire du genre antique. 
Ce serait une erreur, écrit Kour-
tidis, de juger ces romans par 
rapport à leur « classicisme ». 
Au contraire, « Du point de vue 
esthétique, nous trouvons que 
ces œuvres retiennent en elles 
l’atmosphère de leur temps. Les 
mœurs, la famille, sont fidèle-
ment dépeints ». Dans un article 
plus ancien sur Héliodore, 
Kourtidis repère cependant 
dans les Éthiopiques d’impor-
tantes faiblesses concernant les 
analyses psychologiques des 
personnages, tout en recon-
naissant « une conception 
aiguë du monde sensible et 
une habileté descriptive », qui 
font d’Héliodore, à son avis, 
un précurseur de Zola. Il se 
hâte néanmoins d’ajouter que 
les analogies entre Héliodore 
et Zola ne vont naturellement 
pas jusqu’à couvrir la question 
de la morale. Selon Kourtidis, 
Héliodore est un parfait mora-
liste, aux antipodes de Zola, et 
les Éthiopiques pourraient occu-
per une place distinguée dans 
l’histoire des idées morales. 
En conclusion, il note que les 
romans grecs antiques, en dépit 
des préjugés dont ils sont l’ob-
jet, trouvent consécration dans 
l’envergure de leur rayonne-
ment, c’est-à-dire dans le fait 
qu’ils sont devenus membres 
de la « confédération littéraire 
mondiale ».
Dragoumis, Évangélidis et 
Kourtidis ont évidemment envi-
sagé le roman antique en tant 
que genre d’origine grecque, en 
tant qu’une représentation du 
réel privilégiant la beauté de la 
forme discursive et l’orientation 
vers l’édification morale. Ils ont 
délibérément laissé de côté le 
rôle structurel qu’y jouent l’ima-
gination et l’improbable et ont 
ainsi négligé le fait que l’objec-
tif des romans antiques n’était 
absolument pas la représenta-
tion de la réalité, à laquelle au 
contraire ils offraient une échap-
patoire à travers un environne-
ment nébuleux (dans le temps et 
l’espace) noyé dans la brume de 
l’époque classique. En outre, ils 
se sont détournés du fait que les 
personnages du roman antique 
agissent en dehors d’une struc-
ture sociale donnée, en dehors 
d’un temps historique défini qui 
déterminerait leur position et 
leurs attitudes (ainsi qu’il arrive 
avec le roman du réalisme et du 
naturalisme du xixe siècle), mais 
au contraire selon les volontés 
du Destin et du divin. Étant 
donné le développement du 
roman dans l’espace européen 
et sa diffusion de plus en plus 
grande dans l’espace grec, le 
souci commun des trois érudits 
du xixe siècle était de rétablir 
la relation du roman moderne 
avec l’antiquité grecque, soit afin 
d’étendre son prestige, soit pour 
lui attribuer la réussite d’une 
nouvelle réalisation, toujours 
dans le cadre impératif du ren-
forcement de l’identité cultu-
relle et nationale.
L’influence des romans grecs 
antiques sur la création litté-
raire européenne est une ques-
tion complexe défendue par une 
abondante bibliographie inter-
nationale. En ce qui concerne 
le xixe siècle grec, nous pour-
rions formuler les grands traits 
de certains facteurs qui, selon 
toute probabilité, ont faci-
lité le traitement positif des 
romans antiques dans le cadre 
d’une argumentation natio-
nale et patriotique. Les romans 
antiques sont principalement 
centrés sur les personnages et, 
sans être exactement concer-
nés par leur vie intérieure, ils 
traitent néanmoins les relations 
interpersonnelles et familiales, 
ce qui les rend plus proches du 
roman social du xixe siècle. La 
vérité personnelle du sentiment 
et la nécessité de l’union du 
couple à l’intérieur d’une struc-
ture sociale dont le noyau est la 
famille et non la cité ont rendu 
aisée la perception de ces romans 
dans l’optique de l’époque 
contemporaine. Leur réalisme, 
quel qu’il soit, est personnel et 
concentré sur l’individu, tandis 
que leur morale est proche des 
principes moraux du christia-
nisme, élément qui s’accorde à la 
tradition des lectures édifiantes 
du xixe siècle. Cependant, l’élé-
ment qui prédomine dans cet 
intérêt des érudits du xixe siècle 
pour les romans grecs antiques 
est le caractère hellénocentrique 
de son contenu et bien sûr la 
langue. D’elle-même, la langue 
constitue un facteur majeur de 
nationalité et a conduit à l’ap-
propriation des romans grecs, à 
leur intégration dans l’héritage 
culturel hellénique. L’intérêt 
des savants européens manifesté 
pour le roman grec antique au 
cours du xixe siècle a accentué 
davantage le prestige du genre 
et a permis d’établir une corré-
lation avec le passé ancestral, 
même si ce passé est celui de 
la basse antiquité, au cours de 
laquelle la pureté généalogique 
n’est plus soutenue que par la 
suprématie linguistique.
Notes
1. Le texte de la conférence de Kourti-
dis a fait l’objet d’une publication sous 
le titre : Το ελληνικόν διήγημα μέχρι 
της Επαναστάσεως. Ο Αλέξανδρος 
Ραγκαβής ως διηγηματογράφος 
[Le récit grec jusqu’à la Révolu-
tion. Alexandros Rangavis auteur de 
récits], éditeur Michaïl S. Zissakis, 
Athènes 1921, p. 5.

LE ROMAN GREC ANTIQUE AU XIXe SIÈCLE
La description vraisemblable et réaliste de l’Atlantide dans la République 
de Platon, de Coucouville-les-Nuées dans les Oiseaux d’Aristophane et 
les descriptions des lieux imaginaires par Éphémère de Messine sont tous 
des textes antérieurs à la conquête romaine. Ils constituent des preuves 
d’une tradition qui admettait l’imaginaire dans le but de critiquer la situa-
tion de l’époque et de rechercher des issues à la réalité. Finalement, le 
roman grec antique s’est avéré une échappatoire à la réalité à travers l’art 
du discours, la narration fictionnelle.
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For years, I have been working 
on issues of informality. Yet these 
issues are often also branded as 
corruption. The research ques-
tion whether the boundaries 
between the two can be drawn 
cannot be answered with help of 
definitions. Analytical distinc-
tions prove useless in the face of 
practices emb edded in particu-
lar sets of constraints, practical 
norms and ‘moral economies’ 
(Olivier de Sardan 1999, 2008). 
If I am asked to give a one-word 
clue to identify the missing bit 
in the puzzle of crossing boun-
daries between informality and 
corruption, I would say—ambi-
valence. In its sociological sense, 
ambivalence, in the definition 
of Robert Merton, refers to 
incompatible normative expec-
tations of attitudes, beliefs, and 
behaviour. The incompatibility 
is assigned to a status and the 
social structures that generate 
the circumstances in which 
ambivalence is embedded (Mer-
ton 1976: 6-7). The core type of 
sociological ambivalence puts 
contradictory demands upon 
the occupants of a status in a 
particular social relation. Since 
these norms cannot be simulta-
neously expressed in behaviour, 
they come to be expressed in 
an oscillation of behaviours: of 
detachment and compassion, of 
discipline and permissiveness, of 
personal and impersonal treat-
ment (Merton 1976: 8).
THE BI-POLAR CONCEPT 
OF AMBIVALENCE
In the context of modernity, 
ambivalence is associated with 
fragmentation and failure of 
manageability. Zygmunt Bau-
man defines ambivalence as 
the possibility of assigning an 
object or an event to more than 
one category and views it as a 
language-specific disorder. The 
main symptom of disorder is the 
acute discomfort we feel when we 
are unable to read the situation 
properly and to choose between 
alternative actions (Bauman 
1991: 1, 12). Bauman lists ambi-
valence among “the tropes of 
the ‘other’ of order: ambiguity, 
uncertainty, unpredictability, 
illogicality, irrationality, ambiva-
lence, brought about by moder-
nity with its desire to organise 
and to design” (Bauman 1991: 
7). Ambivalence thus implies a 
form of disorder and negativity.
In my view, ambivalence can be 
singled out from the Bauman’s 
list for its bi-polarity, oscillating 
duality (both order and disorder; 
both positivity and negativity), 
and relative clarity of the polar 
positions. It is a social counter-
part of emotional ambivalence 
in psychology (love-hate) or 
materials with ambivalent quali-
ties in physics (semiconductors). 
In other words, it is a situation 
of co-exiting thesis and anti-
thesis, without possibility and 
certainty of their synthesis, yet 
without uncertainty as to what 
co-existing views, attitudes and 
beliefs are. The latter qualifica-
tion would not apply to ambi-
valence in psychoanalysis, where 
is often associated with ambi-
guity. For the purposes of the 
following discussion of substan-
tive, functional and normative 
ambivalence, I distinguish the 
concept of ambivalence from 
ambiguity in the following 
ways. First, ambivalence is a bi-
polar concept, not multi-polar 
as is the case with ambiguity. 
Its poles (thesis and anti-thesis) 
are clearly defined. There is little 
uncertainty as to what these 
poles, or co-existing views, atti-
tudes and beliefs are. The uncer-
tainty is created by the unpre-
dictability of their actualisation.
The incompatibility of consti-
tuents of the ambivalence is 
different from duplicity, from 
the deliberate deceptiveness in 
behaviour or speech, or from 
double-dealing. When moulded 
by the clashing constraints, 
ambivalence can result in the 
ability for doublethink (the illo-
gical logic), dual functionality 
(functionality of the dysfunctio-
nal) and double standards (for 
us and for them). The ambiva-
lence is best understood through 
the paradoxes it produces, such 
as the role of hackers in advan-
cing cybersecurity, for example, 
and can be identified by looking 
into the open secrets of societies 
(Ledeneva 2011).
BLAT
My interest in the theme of 
ambivalence originated in a 
study of blat—the use of perso-
nal networks for getting things 
done in Soviet Russia, or Rus-
sia’s ‘economy of favours’ (Lede-
neva 1998). The latter referred 
not only to the circulation of 
favours—favours of access to the 
centrally distributed goods, ser-
vices and privileges—but also to 
the sociability of blat channels—
friends and friends of friends 
routinely used for tackling shor-
tages and problems. The perva-
siveness of blat turned favours 
into an alternative currency 
of ‘mutual help and mutual 
understanding’ needed for the 
functioning of non-market eco-
nomy and embodied peoples’ 
frustration with the non-consu-
merist ideology and political 
constraints of the centralised 
planning and distribution. On 
the individual level, favours 
delivered by friends, acquain-
tances and friends of friends 
granted solutions to small time 
problems. On a societal level, 
they represented a way out for 
the Soviet system that struggled 
to adhere to its own proclaimed 
principles. A discreet re-distri-
bution of resources within social 
networks—an implicit social 
contract, known as the ‘little 
deal’—became part of the solu-
tion (Millar 1985).
The contradictory nature of 
constraints, and informal prac-
tices needed to resolve them, are 
well reflected in the anecdote 
about six paradoxes of socialism:
• No unemployment but 
nobody works.
• Nobody works but producti-
vity increases.
• Productivity increases but 
shops are empty.
• Shops are empty but fridges 
are full.
• Fridges are full but nobody is 
satisfied.
• Nobody is satisfied but all 
vote unanimously.
Each of these paradoxes hides a 
reference to an informal practice 
that helped the Soviet system to 
continue with its formal claims 
for superiority, yet also under-
mined the declared principles.
A Russian phrase ‘nel’zya, 
no mozhno,’ (prohibited, but 
possible) offered a summary 
understanding of the Soviet 
society with its all-embracing 
restrictions and the labyrinth of 
possibilities around them (the 
shops are empty but fridges are 
full). Blat was an open secret 
for insiders, but a puzzle for 
outsiders unequipped for han-
dling the ‘doublethink’ associa-
ted with blat. It was not that a 
formal ‘no’ necessarily turned 
into ‘yes’ after pulling some blat 
strings. The formula no+blat=yes 
is misleading, for it empha-
sizes the importance of blat but 
downplays the importance of 
constraints. In the Soviet times, 
even outsiders could make use-
ful friends and mobilise them 
and their networks to get things 
done. Yet there was always a 
limit to what friends could do. 
Sometimes blat worked and 
sometimes it didn’t. Thus, its 
formula should grasp both ends 
of the paradox, that is blat=no 
(shops are empty), and at the 
same time blat=yes (fridges are 
full).
BLAT AND SHORTAGE
No coherent rules about blat 
economy of favours, which were 
predominantly associated with 
access to goods and services in 
short supply, could be deduced: 
it was both the formally 
THE AMBIVALENCE OF BLURRED BOUNDARIES:  
WHERE INFORMALITY STOPS AND CORRUPTION BEGINS?
Alena Ledeneva | résidente à l’IEA de Paris
Alena Ledeneva is Professor of Politics and Society at the University College London. She studied Economics at the Novosibirsk State University (1986) and Social 
and Political Theory at the University of Cambridge. She authored a number of books including Can Russia Modernise? Sistema, Power Networks and Informal 
Governance (2013); How Russia Really Works (Cornell University Press, 2006). Her expertise is on Russia and global affairs, global governance and corruption. 
A
le
na
 L
ed
en
ev
a,
 2
0
13
 ©
 C
hr
is
to
p
he
 D
el
o
ry
20
perspectives n. 12 — hiver | winter 2014-2015
prescribed ‘no’ and the infor-
mally pushed ‘yes’ that consti-
tuted an ambivalent outcome, 
somewhat dependant on the size 
and potential of the networks, 
while also being constraint-
driven, context-bound, uncer-
tain and irregular. Moreover, 
under conditions of shortage (or 
rationing), a positive outcome 
for one was preconditioned 
by negative outcomes for the 
others. While the state mono-
poly of centralised distribution 
created shortages, the monopo-
lisation of blat re-distribution 
by each particular gatekeeper 
perpetuated these shortages 
further. The constraints of socia-
lism drove people to outwit the 
centralised distribution system. 
At the same time the harsh-
ness of these constraints made 
it impossible for the regime to 
fully enforce the existing regu-
lations, which created opportu-
nities for brokers to circumvent 
them. ‘Pushers’ of constraints 
(tolkachi and blatmeisters) crea-
ted value for themselves and 
their networks at the expense of 
less-opportunistic players. Thus, 
functionally, blat softened the 
constraints of the Soviet system 
for some but was dependent 
on the continuing existence of 
constraints for others. Working 
with constraints to unleash their 
enabling power became the 
preoccupation of experienced 
brokers, who often functioned 
for the sake of the Soviet system 
but contrary to the system’s own 
rules. Thus blat could function in 
both productive and non-pro-
ductive ways.
INFORMAL PRACTICES 
THAT MAKE ENDS MEET
Obtaining goods and services 
through blat channels provided 
just one example of the many 
informal practices that made the 
Soviet regime more tolerable 
and, at the same time, helped to 
undermine its political, econo-
mic and social foundations. In 
his Economics of Shortage, Janos 
Kornai theorizes principles of 
rationing, or the non-price cri-
teria of allocation, and forms 
of allocation of resources (Kor-
nai 1979). Each of these can 
be associated with an informal 
practice, serving specific needs 
at various stages in socialist 
development. For example, 
associated with queuing is the 
practice of absenteeism from 
a workplace (no unemploy-
ment, but nobody works), that 
in late socialism served people’s 
consumption, but also served to 
alleviate the hardship of queuing 
and to reduce criticism towards 
the regime, incapable of tackling 
shortages. Because absenteeism 
had utility for late socialism and 
could not be ruled out comple-
tely, it was prosecuted by autho-
rities in selective campaigns, 
often to signal that the practice 
went out of proportion or to 
punish regional and local offi-
cials, on whose territories the 
raids for absentees in the shops’ 
queues were made. Selective 
enforcement, or under-enforce-
ment, became the reverse side of 
over-regulation.
The theme of ambivalence 
became similarly central for the 
post-communist transition. In 
my following book, How Rus-
sia Really Works, I argue against 
the stigmatisation of practices 
that replaced blat during Rus-
sia’s dramatic break-up with its 
communist past. Contrary to 
the assumption that informal 
practices had to disappear once 
the oppressive system collapsed, 
I identified new practices that 
emerged and functioned ambi-
valently in order to serve the 
transition: they both supported 
and subverted the post-Soviet 
political, judicial and economic 
institutions. Newly established 
in the 1990s democratic and 
market institutions, inclu-
ding competitive elections, free 
media, independent judiciary, 
and private property rights, 
became enveloped in informal 
practices that both facilitated 
their development and under-
mined it. Practices associated 
with manipulation of electoral 
campaigns (black public rela-
tions or piar), misuse of infor-
mation and compromising 
materials (kompromat), use of 
informal control and leverage 
(krugovaya poruka) in the for-
mally independent judiciary, 
circumventing market-induced 
economic constraints with bar-
ter schemes, non-transparent 
ownership and creative accoun-
ting were the most widespread 
in that period (Ledeneva 2006).
BLAT AND SISTEMA
My initial theorization of 
the ambivalent role of blat 
networks has also helped in 
the subsequent exploration 
of the network-based system 
of informal governance—sis-
tema—under Putin. In periods 
of stability, the ambivalent wor-
kings of blat networks at the 
grassroots are indeed similar to 
those of power networks in sis-
tema, but one important distinc-
tion has to be emphasised. If the 
blat ‘economy of favours’ had to 
some extent an equalising effect 
on the chances of accessing 
resources for networked indi-
viduals and thus reduced the 
privilege gap between insiders 
and outsiders od the centralised 
distribution system, the trickle-
down effect of the present-day 
‘economy of kickbacks’ seems to 
be reverse: it undermines com-
petition, excludes the outsiders, 
and rewards insiders through 
network-based allocation and 
mobilisation. If blat networks 
tended to operate on the basis 
of obligation perceived as 
‘mutual help’, power networks 
tend to operate on the basis of 
a hierarchical, patron–client 
logic, associated with practices 
of ‘feeding’ (kormlenie) aimed to 
enhance the power of the ruler 
and leave his subordinates under 
his ‘manual control’ (Ledeneva 
2013). This difference also stems 
from the political and economic 
frameworks in which networks 
operate. As the Soviet system 
was not economically viable due 
to its centralisation, rigid ideo-
logical constraints, shortages 
and the limited role of money, 
blat networks had some equali-
sing, ‘weapon of the weak,’ role 
in the oppressive conditions, 
and to some extent served the 
economic needs of the central 
distribution system. In Putin’s 
Russia, power networks operate 
without those constraints and 
extract multiple benefits from 
the post-Soviet reforms, while 
undermining the key principles 
of market competition (equality 
of economic subjects and secu-
rity of property rights) and the 
key principle of the rule of law 
(equality before the law). They 
are, in effect, the ‘weapon of the 
strong.’ The effect of dominance, 
omnipresence, pressure under 
which everyone has to live is 
often referred to as ‘sistema.’
What it lacks in democratic 
graces, Russia’s sistema appears 
to compensate with the effecti-
veness of its informal incentives, 
control and capital flows opera-
ted by power networks and their 
impressive capacity to mobilise. 
Reliance on networks enables 
leaders to mobilise and to 
control, yet they also lock politi-
cians, bureaucrats and business-
men into informal deals, media-
ted interests and personalised 
loyalties. This is the ‘moder-
nisation trap of informality’: 
one cannot use the potential of 
informal networks without trig-
gering their negative long-term 
consequences for institutional 
development (Ledeneva 2013).
The similarity of functional 
ambivalence of both blat and 
power networks points to an 
important dimension of Rus-
sia’s modernisation: in order to 
modernise, one should not only 
change the formal rules, but also 
modernise networks. Moderni-
sing networks in the context of 
informality and corruption first 
of all means changing people’s 
attitudes to favours of access 
for ‘svoi’ at all levels. Networks 
through which favours are 
channelled, and their functional 
ambivalence, are essential for 
the understanding of economies 
of favours and their similari-
ties with and differences from 
corruption.
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THE BLURRED 
BOUNDARIES BETWEEN 
SOCIABILITY AND 
INSTRUMENTALITY
It is possible to establish a bor-
derline to distinguish between 
friendship and blat (the use of 
friendship) in practical terms—
if a help to a friend comes from 
one’s own pocket, it is help of a 
friend, if a help to a friend comes 
at the expense or through redis-
tribution of public resources, it 
is a favour of access. The nature 
of formal constraints, the lack of 
private property or clear divi-
sions between the public and 
the private in socialist societies, 
provides a degree of entitlement 
to whatever the economy of 
favours has to offer. As opposed 
to favours given, received or 
exchanged at the expense of 
personal resources, an eco-
nomy of favours implies that a 
favour-giver is not only a giver 
but also a gatekeeper or a broker 
benefiting from the position of 
access and discretionary powers. 
It is also often the case that a 
favour-recipient is not only a 
beneficiary of a re-distributed 
object or service, delivered by 
a friend, a friend of a friend or 
a broker, but also a recipient of 
what s/he is entitled to have. 
In other words, a favour does 
not produce an outcome visibly 
different from that achieved in 
other ways (inheriting, ratio-
ning, queuing, purchasing in 
black market), which makes 
defining the boundaries even 
more difficult to establish.
To complicate matters further, 
the difference between socia-
bility and instrumentality is 
defined not only by the source 
of resources (private or public) 
but also by the incentive (mate-
rial or non-material). Thus, the 
intermediation of blat is essen-
tial to protect one’s positive and 
altruistic self-image and to mis-
recognise one’s own experiences: 
one helps a friend, not oneself, 
and that friend returns a favour 
eventually. Both parties main-
tain a ‘good friend’ self-image 
while using public resources for 
‘non-selfish’ purposes. When the 
moral norms prescribe that one 
must help a friend but also that 
blat is immoral and unethical, 
the normative ambivalence—
the partial ‘misrecognition 
game’—is the way out.
Selfless re-distribution of 
public funds for a moral cause 
is not likely to be seen as self-
serving, or corrupt. And yet, 
where there is a potential of 
mutuality, sociability breeds 
instrumentality. Selflessness of 
favours, or disinterested giving, 
is an essential feature of an 
economy of favours: ‘I favour 
your interests, you favour mine, 
and we are both selfless and 
non-interested in material gain 
individuals.’ Acting sociably, for 
a non-material and/or non-per-
sonal gain, allows the giver not 
to cross the borderline of a cor-
rupt exchange, while the reci-
pient of material gain is not in 
the position to re-direct public 
resources and technically does 
nothing wrong. Where a ‘favour 
of access’ involves the misuse of 
public office, the self-image is 
‘rescued’ from being corrupt by 
an altruistic incentive and the 
lack of direct private gain. 
In turn, non-material incen-
tives may include all kinds of 
moral or emotional gains and 
losses. Apart from grace, noted 
by Julian Pitt-Rivers (2011) 
and Humphrey (2012), dignity 
and humiliation can certainly 
be brought into the discussion 
of non-material incentives. In 
literary sources, Eric Naiman 
observes, they seem to undergird 
just about every act of giving 
and receiving, and the recipient’s 
sense of self-worth (dignity) 
and the degree of resentment he 
experiences, even—and perhaps 
especially—towards those who 
do the most for him are essen-
tial components in the unders-
tanding of the meaning and 
consequences of any favour. The 
sense of daily frustration sur-
rounding the material aspects 
of much late-Soviet life surely 
had an impact on the giving and 
receiving of favours, and their 
perception.
THE BLURRED 
BOUNDARIES BETWEEN 
FAVOURS OF ACCESS 
AND CORRUPT 
TRANSACTIONS 
The resemblance of blat favours 
aimed at circumventing formal 
rules and procedures—mani-
pulating access to resources 
through direct purchase as in 
bribery or diverting of public 
resources for personal gain—
makes them a member of a 
wider family of informal prac-
tices and complicates the mat-
ter of drawing the boundaries 
between favours and corrupt 
exchanges (Ledeneva 1998: 
39-59). It also raises the ques-
tion whether blat was in fact a 
dysfunctional corrupt practice. 
This may be the case in certain 
contexts but it is also misleading, 
for neither blat nor corruption 
have a clear or single meaning, 
nor are these terms independent 
of normative, context-free 
judgement (Ledeneva 2009). 
According to Lampert (1984: 
371), cases of corruption have 
a ranking specific to the society. 
The Soviets clearly felt that bri-
bery was a worse form of cor-
ruption than a small scale use 
of public resources for private 
ends (such as using workers to 
do private jobs in enterprise 
time). Cultural connotations 
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of money as ‘dirty’ made non-
monetary transactions fairly 
legitimate (Humphrey, 2000). 
This was in tune with the dis-
tinction drawn between various 
forms of offence in the Criminal 
Code and the different penalties 
for engaging in them (Heinzen, 
2007). Blat was not on the cri-
minal scale at all and could not 
strictly speaking be characte-
rized as illegal (by reason of its 
small scale or recognized neces-
sity (voiti v polozhenie), thus 
falling in the category of ‘good’ 
or ‘ambiguous’ corruption (see 
also Krastev, 2004). The oppres-
sive nature of the communist 
regime, and its centralized way 
of distribution of goods and pri-
vileges, introduces another twist 
in interpretation of the nature of 
blat practices: if blat corrupted 
the corrupt regime, can we refer 
to it as corruption? With these 
considerations in mind, to equate 
blat and corruption in Soviet 
conditions is to misunderstand 
the nature of Soviet socialism.
It is tempting to argue that blat 
subverted the Soviet system, and 
thus should be held responsible 
for undermining its principles 
and foundations leading to the 
ultimate collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Yet blat also served the 
needs of socialist system, and 
thus supported its existence, 
operating contrary to the sys-
tem’s own acclaimed principles. 
Such functionality of the dys-
functional, or ambivalence, 
applies, for example, to the role 
of hackers in advancing cyberse-
curity (Ledeneva 2000; Assange 
et al. 2012). Apart from the 
ambivalent relationship (subver-
sive/ supportive) with the Soviet 
institutions, blat produced a 
similar bearing on personal rela-
tionships—people were forced 
to use their personal networks 
instrumentally and that ins-
trumentality helped to sustain 
those networks. People were 
made to want to be ‘needed’: 
former blatmeisters are nostalgic 
about blat, and babushki mind 
being replaced by professional 
child carers. The ambivalence of 
social networks is an interesting 
angle to explore as it helps iden-
tify similarities and differences 
in those conditions that make 
people use their networks for 
getting things done in different 
societies.
FROM ETHNOGRAPHY TO 
THE NEXT GENERATION 
INDICATORS
In my ethnographic fieldwork of 
economies of favours and infor-
mal governance, I have searched 
for signs of recognition of invi-
sible matters one does not need 
to spell out: semi-taboos about 
economies of favours, compli-
city to leave things unarticu-
lated, ambivalence of attitudes 
towards sensitive subjects. These 
are all pointers to the potenti-
ally innovative research. Socie-
ties’ open secrets, such as eco-
nomies of favour and others, 
have a great potential for novel 
research. However there are ine-
vitable obstacles to the study of 
ambivalence, whether substan-
tive, functional or normative.
Quantitatively, the size of eco-
nomies of favours is even harder 
to assess than that of non-quan-
tifiable forms of corruption, such 
as nepotism, conflict of inte-
rest, hospitality (TI 2011). The 
subjectivity of value of favours, 
their cross-cultural incompara-
bility and ambivalence makes it 
impossible to measure the size 
of economies of favours objec-
tively. Rather, one could assess 
a spread of the phenomenon, 
following the methodology of 
measuring perception, as in the 
Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI). It should also be possible 
to measure the gap between 
the perception of others’ use of 
favours and self-reported expe-
rience of giving and receiving 
favours. Given cultural specifi-
city of economies of favours—
there are often no exact trans-
lations of related idioms, slang, 
or jargon from one language to 
another—qualitative research is 
essential to establish the facili-
tating conditions, main gatekee-
pers, principles of inclusion 
and exclusion, multiplicity of 
norms, needs satisfied, degrees 
of obligation and codification, 
influence of kinship, tradition 
and religion, social inequality 
and other divisive narratives. 
The main challenge, however, 
is to create quantitative indica-
tors for the ‘immeasurable’ that 
would grasp ambivalence, mis-
recognition, doublethink, and 
double standards, and that could 
potentially be comparable across 
societies and move beyond the 
existing paradigms of measuring 
corruption.
One unintended consequence 
of the ‘informalisation’ of glo-
bal economy (Sassen) is that the 
existing indicators of perfor-
mance and change are becoming 
less effective. In the studies of 
corruption, the contemporary 
global corruption paradigm 
(GCP) with its governance 
indicators and multiple indices 
seems to have exhausted its 
measurement and policy poten-
tial. On the one hand, it has 
been dubbed as a magnificent 
policy failure (Persson, Roths-
tein, Teorell 2013) due to its 
incapacity to achieve its proclai-
med goal—to reduce corruption 
all over the world. On the other 
hand, the present paradigm has 
turned unequipped to handle 
the ‘globalisation’ of corruption 
practices, as majority of indices 
are tied to the countries, and 
to differentiate between cultu-
ral contexts, assuming that 
corruption would be the same 
everywhere. The aim of a collo-
quium hold at the Institute of 
Advanced Studies in Paris on 
26-27 June was to explore the 
following questions:
• Comparing the incomparable:
How to create culture sensitive 
next generation indicators that 
would be compatible with exis-
ting transnational surveys? Can 
Drazen Prelec’s ‘truth serum’ 
methodology be applied to 
the corruption perception data 
(Prelec 2004)?
• Corruption and political trust: 
Which invisible practices we 
need to know about to assess 
the quality of government and 
governance comparatively? 
Which are the questions that 
could/should be included in 
general social or political sur-
veys? What are the ways to 
assess the impact of the percep-
tion of corruption on political 
behaviors and attitudes?
• Practical norms: For the 
contexts of systemic corrup-
tion, one should search for the 
bottom-up, user-friendly indi-
cators for informal practices, 
with focus on strength rather 
than frequency of relationships 
and practical norms rather than 
perceptions. How does media, 
new media and social media pin 
down practical norms? How to 
visualise and articulate the invi-
sibility of informal practices?
• Ambivalence of corruption: 
Identifying societies’ practical 
norms and open secrets, such as 
implicit acceptance of corrupt 
practices and their functionality, 
presents a challenge. Corruption 
gets lost between insiders’ and 
outsiders’ miscommunication. 
How to construct indicators 
that would reflect cultural diffe-
rences and ambivalent attitudes 
towards corruption? How to 
tackle the issue of ambivalence 
of principal and agent roles, of 
public and private interests, 
of double standards and the 
Orwell’s doublethink in contexts 
with systemic corruption. Is it 
possible to assess the spread of 
double standards in societies? 
• Norm reversal: Within the 
existing measurements, how to 
distinguish indicators for the 
countries with systemic cor-
ruption—where corruption is 
a practical norm—from indi-
cators for the countries where 
corruption is a deviation? Can 
a national-based compari-
son be replaced? What are the 
alternatives?
• Nudge policies: Following 
Richard Thaler and Cass 
Sunshine ‘nudge’ approach 
from behavioral science, is it 
possible to create indirect anti-
corruption policies that would 
be small-scale, yet effective in 
changing people’s behaviours? 
The idea is to explore the pos-
sibility of ‘oblique’ approach, 
suggested by John Kay in his 
Obliquity, for the anti-corrup-
tion policies.
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Petros STANGOS Vicissitudes et 
faux-semblants dans la faillite d’un 
Etat membre de l’Union économique 
et monétaire européenne : le cas de 
la Grèce
Ibrahima THIOUB Identités 
chromatiques en Afrique: histoires, 
héritages et actualité
Tie XIAO Au nom des masses : 
imaginer la foule dans la Chine 
moderne, 1900-1950
• IEA DE PARIS
Hervé ABDI Cognitive 
Neuroscience of Memory
Giuseppe BIANCO Normes 
sociales et normes vitales : l’itinéraire 
intellectuel de Georges Canguilhem
Mary BRYDEN Translating the 
First World War
Chiara CAPPELLETTO L’acteur 
sur scène : une approche neuroes-
thétique de l’ex-centricité de l’être 
humain
Barbara COOPER Un regard 
historique : le débat sur la fécondité 
dans le Sahel musulman
Olga DANILOVA Le rôle des 
collectionneurs et de leurs collections 
dans la circulation des savoirs et 
dans le développement des relations 
franco-russes en sciences humaines 
(du milieu du xixe siècle au début des 
années 1920)
Emmanuel DEBRUYNE Une 
Résistance « avant la lettre ». La 
guerre clandestine en pays occupés. 
France et Belgique, 1914-1918
Monika FLUDERNIK Diachro-
nic Narratology: Late Medieval 
and Early Modern English Prose 
Narrative
Antonino DE FRANCESCO 
Interprétations du monde pré-
romain dans la culture politique de 
l’Europe moderne
Itzhak FRIED The volitional self 
and its brain
Timothy HAMPTON The Politics 
of Babel. The Languages of Diplo-
macy in Early Modern Europe
Nancy Rose HUNT 
Health & Medicine: A 
World History
Saadi LAHLOU Contexte 
et activation des soi : une 
étude empirique
Mark LILLA Ignorance et bonheur
Leonid LIVAK Cultural and Lin-
guistic Displacement in the Creative 
Activity of Modern European Wri-
ters: Sophia Petit, Ludmila Savitzky, 
Zinaida Vengerova
Claudine MOULIN Entre les 
lignes et dans les marges. Vers une 
histoire culturelle de l’annotation
Gianenrico PAGANINI Histoire 
de la pensée clandestine (de Jean 
Bodin à Jean Meslier). Judaïsme et 
Islam dans les réseaux manuscrits 
philosophiques
Vincent POULIOT L’ordre 
hiérarchique international: Une 
sociologie politique de la diplomatie 
multilatérale
Philippe ROCHAT Identity, pre-
judice, and duplicity in development
Brian SANDBERG Un Cou-
rage viril. Le genre et la violence 
en France pendant les Guerres de 
Religion
Massimo VOGLIOTTI Quelle 
formation juridique aujourd’hui?
Levent YILMAZ Giambat-
tista Vico’s reception in Europe: 
New Science and the beginnings 
of modern historiography and 
philology.
• COLLEGIUM  
DE LYON
Eleonora SANTIN
Ancienne résidente au Colle-
gium de Lyon, elle vient d’être 
recutée au CNRS en tant que 
chargée de recherches.
Giulio PALUMBI
Ancien résident au Collegium 
de Lyon, il vient d’être recuté 
au CNRS en tant que chargé de 
recherches.
Alistair COLE
Ancien résident au Collegium 
de Lyon, il vient d’être recuté en 
tant que professeur des universi-
tés à Science Po Lyon
• IMéRA AIX-  
MARSEILLE
Serge PROULX
Ancien résident de l’IMéRA, 
Serge Proulx a publié La contri-
bution en ligne. Pratiques partici-
patives à l ’ère du capitalisme infor-
mationnel, Presses de l’Université 
du Québec, 2014. Alors que les 
utilisateurs acceptent d’alimen-
ter massivement de vastes cor-
pus numériques, les entreprises 
propriétaires des plateformes 
du Web social captent les traces 
de ces contributions bénévoles 
qui, une fois accumulées dans 
des bases relationnelles de don-
nées, deviennent génératrices 
de valeur économique : c’est le 
capitalisme informationnel.
Comment interpréter ce phé-
nomène contradictoire et para-
doxal ? Pourrait-on parler d’un 
capitalisme de la contribution ? 
Cet ouvrage soulève les enjeux à 
la fois économiques, politiques,
médiatiques et épistémiques de 
la contribution en ligne.
Article de Barbara ALLEN 
dans Powerless Science?
Barbara Allen, ancienne rési-
dente, sociologue (Virginia Tech 
University), a contribué à l’ou-
vrage Powerless Science? Science 
and Politics in a Toxic World 
(Soraya Boudia and Nathalie 
Jas (ed.), Berghahn) avec l’ar-
ticle « rom Suspicious Illness to 
Policy Change in Petrochemical 
Regions: Popular Epidemiology, 
Science and the Law in the U.S. 
and Italy ».
• IEA DE NANTES
Cinquième anniversaire de 
l’IEA de Nantes
L’IEA de Nantes a réuni, les 23 
et 24 juin derniers, ses anciens et 
actuels résidents à l’occasion de 
son 5e anniversaire. Cet événe-
ment était le premier d’une série 
de rendez-vous intitulée Poids et 
mesures du monde, dont chaque 
édition sera l’occasion de dis-
cuter l’un des ouvrages publiés 
dans la collection du même nom 
créée par l’Institut aux éditions 
Fayard.
 
Ibrahima Thioub
Membre associé de l’IEA de 
Nantes, il a été nommé recteur 
de l’Université Cheikh Anta 
Diop de Dakar. Il prend ainsi 
la tête de l’une des plus impor-
tantes universités d’Afrique 
francophone.
 
Collection « Poids et Mesures 
du Monde »
L’ouvrage Hind Swaraj, La Voie 
de l ’émancipation paraîtra dans 
la collection dirigée par l’IEA 
de Nantes chez Fayard. Il s’agit 
de la traduction en français 
de l’édition critique d’un texte 
de Gandhi réalisée par Suresh 
Sharma, ancien résident, et Tri-
dip Surup. 
• IEA DE PARIS
Emmanuel BERGER
Ancien résident à l’IEA de Paris, 
il vient de publier Popular Justice 
in Europe (18th-19th Centuries), 
il Mulino - Duncker & Hum-
blot, Bologna - Berlin, 2014.
Marcel FOURNIER
Ancien résident à l’IEA de 
Paris, il a reçu le prix History of 
Sociology Distinguished Scholarly 
Publication Award de l’American 
Sociological Association lors du 
congrès annuel de la société qui 
a eu lieu du 15 au 19 août 2014 à 
San Francisco pour son ouvrage 
Émile Durkheim : A Biography, 
publié chez Polity Press en 2013.
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Un examen de la littérature 
francophone contemporaine sur 
le français montre que la ques-
tion de sa vitalité est souvent 
articulée en relation avec la 
notion de FRANCOPHONIE 
tant dans son acception comme 
communauté de locuteurs de 
français que dans celle de la 
« Francophonie institution-
nelle », plutôt politique, réunis-
sant des États et gouvernements 
ayant le « français en partage » 
(quelle que soit la proportion des 
locuteurs réels de cette langue). 
Cette mise en relation tend à 
servir deux positionnements en 
apparence contradictoires : 1) 
le français est une « grande » 
langue comme l’atteste son 
expansion sur différents conti-
nents ; 2) la vitalité du français 
est menacée par l’expansion de 
l’anglais, raison pour laquelle il 
faut resserrer les rangs de la Fran-
cophonie institutionnelle qui, 
elle, témoigne d’un respect pour 
la diversité linguistique et qui 
par sa seule existence contribue 
à la préserver. Le premier posi-
tionnement est construit à partir 
d’une homologie entre puissance 
économique (en l’occurrence 
ici coloniale) et grandeur d’une 
langue (déclinée au fil des siècles 
sous différentes formes) qui 
permet a posteriori de justifier 
un « combat » mené pour son 
maintien et sa diffusion : il faut 
tout faire pour que le français 
reste une « grande » langue (et 
ne devienne pas inférieur à son 
rival impérial : l’anglais). L’argu-
ment du maintien de la diversité 
linguistique du second position-
nement n’est pas une spécificité 
des défenseurs du français ; il est 
plutôt l’application, aux langues, 
d’un discours plus général sur la 
défense de la biodiversité. /…/
Force est de constater que le dis-
cours sur la menace de l’anglais 
sur le français a, jusqu’à présent, 
rarement fait l’objet d’investiga-
tions ethnographiques permet-
tant d’en évaluer l’ampleur, à part 
pour le Québec où les enjeux éco-
nomiques, politiques et idéolo-
giques de la présence de l’anglais 
sont ressentis d’abord comme 
une menace de l’intérieur, consé-
quence des enjeux écologiques 
locaux. Les quelques exemples 
souvent cités sur la pénétration 
de l’anglais dans le discours 
publicitaire français ou sur l’obli-
gation faite aux employé(e)s de 
multinationales implantées sur le 
sol français de recourir à l’anglais 
sur le lieu de travail sont fondés, 
à notre connaissance, plus sur des 
impressions que sur des études 
ethnographiques. Pour revenir au 
cas du français, on peut dire que 
le discours militantiste (advocacy) 
sur les langues « indigènes » 
en danger véhiculé par les lin-
guistes surtout anglo-saxons a 
non seulement alimenté ceux des 
défenseurs du français mais les 
a aussi légitimés. Si ce discours 
sur la « menace » à laquelle sont 
ou seraient exposées les langues 
« indigènes » suite à leurs contacts 
avec des langues coloniales euro-
péennes a trouvé un tel écho dans 
les assises de la Francophonie 
institutionnelle et parmi l’intel-
ligentsia « francophoniste » de 
l’hémisphère Nord (notamment 
française et québécoise) à la fin 
du xxe siècle, c’est parce qu’elle 
s’inscrit parfaitement dans l’his-
toire des discours sur le français, 
construit comme langue en dan-
ger depuis le xve siècle. Dans son 
chapitre, Douglas Kibbee montre 
ainsi comment la question de la 
« menace » sur le français s’est 
d’abord articulée autour d’une 
bataille sur la standardisation, 
avec en toile de fond des ques-
tions de légitimité sociale : par 
exemple, quelle prononciation 
favoriser et quelle orthographe 
utiliser. Ainsi, avant d’être de l’ex-
térieur, la « menace » était perçue 
comme venant de l’intérieur. La 
peur de la « bâtardisation » du 
français est encore fortement 
ancrée dans les mentalités fran-
çaises hexagonales comme en 
attestent les résistances modernes 
aux simplifications orthogra-
phiques, d’ailleurs bien plus que 
dans les autres pays francophones 
ou la mise à l’index de variétés de 
français nées du contact entre 
populations françaises d’origine 
africaine vivant à la périphé-
rie des grands centres urbains.
Si la « menace » de l’anglais 
est quant à elle constitutive de 
l’histoire du français depuis 
le xvie siècle, la manière dont 
elle s’articule emprunte désor-
mais des formes nouvelles. Elle 
s’opère par un décentrement du 
français au profit de toutes les 
autres langues. Ainsi, l’anglais 
est présenté non plus comme 
une menace pour le français 
mais plus largement pour la 
diversité linguistique. Le décen-
trement de la bataille (français 
vs anglais) s’opère à partir d’un 
recentrement sur la francopho-
nie où il ne s’agit plus de lutter 
contre l’anglais mais contre un 
effet de la mondialisation inter-
prétée unilatéralement comme 
une américanisation de toutes 
les sociétés du monde. Ce glis-
sement politique et sémantique 
est illustré par cet extrait du site 
Internet de l’Académie fran-
çaise : « La francophonie repré-
sente un groupe de pression 
apte à défendre la place du 
français dans les organisations 
internationales et à s’opposer à 
l’uniformisation culturelle que 
cherche à imposer le monde 
anglo-saxon ».
De la dichotomie « francopho-
nie » vs « monde anglo-saxon », 
nous retiendrons ici deux élé-
ments : 1) l’agentivité (« apte à 
défendre […] et à s’opposer ») 
donnée à la « francophonie » 
en tant que communauté des 
locuteurs du français définie 
comme « un groupe de pres-
sion » pour contrer l’hégémonie 
du « monde anglo-saxon » ; 2) 
le caractère prémédité et volon-
taire (« cherche à imposer ») du 
monde anglo-saxon à unifor-
miser le monde faisant des pays 
« réceptifs » à son influence, des 
réservoirs passifs. /…/
Ce décentrement du face-à-
face idéologique (français vs 
anglais) s’articule aussi autour 
de la notion de « langues par-
tenaires » (utilisée depuis à peu 
près 2000 dans les discours de 
la Francophonie institutionnelle 
et de ses organes) où le fran-
çais est discursivement placé 
au même rang que les autres 
langues, notamment africaines, 
devant la menace que constitue 
l’anglais à leur survie. Ce reposi-
tionnement idéologique s’opère 
à partir d’un double processus 
d’« effacement » et de « récursi-
vité » (respectivement, erasure et 
recursivity en anglais, selon Gal 
& Irvine, 1995).
Le processus d’effacement est 
celui de l’histoire linguistique 
ancienne et contemporaine fran-
çaise qualifiée d’hégémonique 
dans la mesure où elle a conduit 
à une disparition volontaire des 
langues régionales sur son sol 
national à travers l’imposition 
du français à l’école. Plus récem-
ment, elle a conduit à la décul-
turation partielle de générations 
d’Africains scolarisés dans la 
langue du colonisateur. Il est à 
noter que le français est une des 
rares langues au monde à s’être 
diffusé surtout à travers l’institu-
tion scolaire même dans son ter-
ritoire d’origine. Cela explique 
peut-être pourquoi les stratégies 
actuelles envisagées pour son 
maintien, notamment dans les 
pays d’Afrique, se concentrent 
principalement sur l’éducation 
scolaire, alors que l’école n’est pas 
une condition suffisante pour 
la survie d’une langue, comme 
l’attestent les cas contrastés de 
l’Irlande et du Québec. /…/
Le processus de récursivité quant 
à lui consiste à transposer une 
dynamique opérant à un niveau 
de relations, à un autre niveau. 
Ici, il s’opère par le déplace-
ment du « combat pour le fran-
çais », contre l’anglais, à celui 
d’un combat pour la défense 
de la diversité linguistique, qui 
concerne toutes les langues. Une 
telle opération de transposition 
implique que : 1) les langues 
soient considérées seulement 
d’un point de vue dénotation-
nel sans référence aucune à leur 
caractère indexical ; 2) le marché 
linguistique d’une écologie don-
née ne soit pas envisagé comme 
stratifié : toute langue est socia-
lement équivalente à toute autre, 
alors que les fonctions sociales 
des langues sont hautement hié-
rarchisées ; 3) dans les écologies 
où le français maintient son sta-
tut hégémonique de langue offi-
cielle, il est tout à fait normal de 
maintenir le statu quo. Il semble 
importer peu aux chantres du 
« partenariat langagier » que les 
locuteurs des langues dites « par-
tenaires » puissent penser que ce 
partenariat sert plus au maintien 
du français langue impériale 
qu’à la préservation des langues 
indigènes, qui bénéficient de 
peu de soutien institutionnel sur 
le terrain. En effet, les langues 
vernaculaires (officiellement) 
absentes du système scolaire ou 
qui sont pariées par des popu-
lations peu nombreuses ne sont 
pas prises en compte. Aucune 
indication ne nous est donnée 
qui montre que la Francophonie 
institutionnelle soit consciente 
du fait que certaines de ces 
langues vernaculaires si ce n’est 
toutes, sont menacées par les 
vernaculaires urbains qui fonc-
tionnent aussi comme lingua 
franca régionales. Au regard de 
ce constat, on est tenté de penser 
que le spectre de la globalisation 
agité par la Francophonie insti-
tutionnelle comme le nouveau 
coupable de l’« éradication lin-
guistique » n’est qu’un prétexte 
pour continuer le combat déjà 
long contre l’anglais, mais sous 
d’autres formes. Au regard de ce 
qui vient d’être dit, la question 
de la vitalité du français à l’âge 
de la globalisation est un sujet 
multidimensionnel, depuis son 
expansion en Europe jusqu’à 
son exportation vers d’autres 
territoires et son appropriation 
par des populations pour les-
quelles il n’est pas une langue 
d’héritage ancestrale. Compte 
tenu de la diversité des écologies 
dans lesquelles le français est 
présent, il paraît présomptueux 
pour une institution ou des indi-
vidus de préconiser une stratégie 
commune à adopter pour pré-
server la vitalité du français, si 
besoin il y avait, ou la diversité 
linguistique et culturelle.
COLONISATION, GLOBALISATION ET VITALITÉ DU FRANÇAIS
Salikoko Mufwene et Cécile B. Vigouroux | anciens résidents du Collegium de Lyon
Professeur de linguistique à l ’université de Chicago, Salikoko Mufwene porte ses recherches sur l ’évolution linguistique ainsi que sur l ’évolution phylogénétique 
du langage. Cécile Vigouroux est linguiste ethnographe de formation et professeure associée au département de français à l ’université Simon Fraser (Colombie 
Britannique, Canada) où elle enseigne la sociolinguistique et l ’histoire du français. Ce texte est extrait de l ’ouvrage paru sous leur direction : Colonisation, glo-
balisation et vitalité du français aux éditions Odile Jacob, 2013.
